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("SPVs"). An SPV is designed under the law to be a bankruptcy-remote
investment entity, such that if its parent is forced to file for bankruptcy,
the SPV will be evaluated on its independent merits. However, some
court decisions hold that an SPV structure may be pierced or legally
modified to provide funds to satisfy the creditor and investor claims of

its insolvent originator.The court decisions in In re LTV Steel Co., In re
Pacific Lumber Co., and In re General Growth Properties Inc. have
direct impacts on the attractiveness of an SPV for creditors and

investors, and they suggest actions that the originatorand the SPV can
take to preserve the SPV's bankruptcy-remote status.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Securitization is a financial process of pooling and repackaging
debt into securities that are sold to investors.' Through securitization, a
corporation conveys discounted cash-flow-producing assets to a
financial intermediary, SPV, which combines them with similar assets
2
and sells them as securities to investors. An SPV is a subsidiary of the
1. See Jason H.P. Kravitt, Introduction, in ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION INEUROPE 1, 1
(Theodor Baums & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1996) (noting that securitization is commonly defined as
"the pooling of assets and the issuing of securities to finance the c:rrying of the pooled assets");
SECURIT1ZATION: ASSET-BACKED AND MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 1-3 (Ronald S.Borod ed.,
1991) (noting that securitization is "the aggregation and pooling of assets with similar
characteristics in such a way that investors may purchase interests or securities backed by those
assets").
2. Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1655, 1663 (2004). SPVs in securitization are also often referred to as special purpose
entities ("SPEs"), variable interest entities ("VIEs"), issuer, issuing entity, or trust (in the
prospectus). See 17 C.F.R. § 229.1101(f) (2011); Mei Feng et al., Special Purpose Vehicles:
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corporation (the "originator") that is created to isolate the financial risk
of assets that previously belonged to the originator.3 Generally, an SPV
has no employees, no physical location, and makes no substantive
economic decisions. An SPV maintains a legal status that is intended to
make its obligations secure even if the parent company goes bankrupt. 5
Thus, an SPV is commonly referred to as a "bankruptcy-remote" entity. 6
By converting future cash flows into present cash, securitization permits
the originator to benefit from isolating itself from financial risk, creating
new means of raising capital, and providing lowered costs to lenders and
consumers. 7 The investors in these securities benefit from
competitive
8
probability.
default
composite
lowered
a
and
rates
interest
The origins of securitization in the United States are traced to the
1970s when the Government National Mortgage Association ("Ginnie
Mae") developed mortgaged-back securities collateralized by singlefamily Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration
mortgage loans. 9 Since then, commercial banks, savings and loan
associations, and other entities have participated in securitization of a
variety of assets such as residential and commercial loans, automobile

Empirical Evidence on Determinants and Earnings Management, 84 ACCT. REV. 1833, 1834
(2009); Gary B. Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization 7
(FRB Phila., Working Paper No. 05-21, 2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract id=713782.
3. See Feng et al., supra note 2, at 1834, 1838. See also Plank, supra note 2, at 1662.
4. See Gorton & Souleles, supra note 2, at 2 ("SPVs are essentially robot firms that have no
employees, make no substantive economic decisions, have no physical location, and cannot go
bankrupt.").
5. Feng et al., supra note 2, at 1834 ("SPVs can serve legitimate business purposes by
raising capital for their sponsors and by isolating and homogenizing cash flows and business risks of
a specific asset class.").
6. Plank, supra note 2, at 1663. See Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process:
Theory and Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 77 (2011) ("Unlike the case of corporate bonds,
where the credible threat of bankruptcy helps overcome the coordination problems of a unanimous
vote requirement, securitizations are shielded from bankruptcy.").
7. Plank, supra note 2, at 1656-57. See also CHRISTINE A. PAVEL, SECURITIZATION: THE
ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOAN-BASED/ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS 13-16
(1989).
8. See Paul Lund, Is Corporate Securitization Set to Take Off?.: Why the Structuring
Technique May Prove Important in the Current Turbulent Market Conditions, J. STRUCTURED FIN.,
Summer 2008, at 46, 46 ("Corporate securitizations therefore provide borrowers with necessary
leverage and offer lenders and investors a transaction that is attractive from a credit perspective,
which is particularly crucial given current market conditions and the rise of new issue institutional
spreads.").
9. See Barbara Kavanagh et al., Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Programs, 78 FED. RES.
BULL. 107, 107-08 (1992) (noting the history of securitization). See also Claire A. Hill,
Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1119-21 (1996)
(reporting on the history of securitization); Kyle Richard & Melissa Kosiba, Securitization: A
Platform to Debate Accounting, CPA J., Oct. 2005, at 10, 10.
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loans, credit card receivables, equipment leases and loans, student loans,
trade receivables, computer and truck leases, intellectual property
rights, ° and other receivables." Securitization has even extended to
taxicab medallions, 2 unpaid real estate taxes, 3 and David Bowie's
music royalties. 14 All of these asset receivables share a similar
characteristic: proceeds that can be used as collateral for asset-backed
securities ("ABS").15
Securitization is acknowledged as "one of the most significant legal
and business innovations of the last 30 years"1 6 because of its
importance to the growth of the national economy.' 7 In late 2009, the
total value of securitized assets in the United States exceeded $2.48
trillion. 18 Despite this popularity, recent legal developments have
revealed that securitization has one important drawback that creates risk
for all interested parties. While the process of securitization is designed
and intended to create a bankruptcy-remote vehicle, case law
demonstrates that in bankruptcy proceedings of the originator its SPVs
are bankruptcy-remote and not bankruptcy proof.' 9 Thus, an SPV cannot
10. See F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, An Approach to IntellectualProperty, Bankruptcy,
and Corporate Control, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1313, 1325 (2004). See also Lois R. Lupica, Asset
Securitization: The UnsecuredCreditor'sPerspective, 76 TEx. L. REV. 595, 606-07 (1998).
11. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, I STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
133, 152 (1994) ("Securitization opportunities are no longer limited to the financing of
receivables.").
12. Lupica, supranote 10, at 602.
13. See id. at 606 & n.25 ("New York City raised $208 million in a AAA-rated public bond
offering backed by $1.5 billion in unpaid real estate taxes. In 1993, Jersey City, New Jersey was the
first municipality to raise funds in the markets backed by unpaid real estate taxes."). Further, Lupica
noted that "[iut has been predicted that the 'municipal tax lien securitization market will grow to at
least $5 billion a year,' as governments get out of the tax collection business." Id. at 606 n.25
(quoting Amy B. Resnick, Tax-Lien Market is Set to Take Off,Industry Players Say, BOND BUYER,
Nov. 18, 1996, available at 1996 WLNR 736274).
14. Martin Waller, Bankers and Old Rockers Aim to Reap the Play-It-Again Sum, TIMES
(London), Feb. 14, 1998, at 30. See also Jennifer Burke Sylva, Bowie Bonds Soldfor FarMore
Than a Song: The Securitization of Intellectual Property as a Super-Charged Vehicle for High
Technology Financing,15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 195, 200-06 (1999).
15. See Kavanagh et al., supranote 9, at 108-09 (noting that ABS programs use SPVs to issue
commercial paper).
16. Plank, supra note 2, at 1656.
17. See Enron Aside, Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) Are Legal, Innovative and Widely
Used, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 17, 2006), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/articlepdf/

1483.pdf?CFID=l 69299392&CFTOKEN=73138482&jsessionid=a830dacab14db2252 Iad2517428
301 e49331 [hereinafter Enron Aside].
18. Outstanding U.S. Bond Market Debt: $ Billions, SIFMA, http://www.investinginbonds.
com/assets/files/SIFMAUSBondMarketOutstanding.xls (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (displaying that
in the third quarter of 2009, asset backed securities amounted to $2484.3 billion).
19. Jason Lynch, ReevaluatingBankruptcy Remoteness: Transfers of Risk, Implications of the
GGP Reorganization,AM. BANKR. INST. J., July-Aug. 2010, at 58, 58-60 (noting that during "the
resulting recessionary period, structured investment vehicles demonstrated why they were termed
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always provide absolute protection against the originator's creditors and
investors who pursue securitized assets as means of recovery.
Court decisions suggest that the separate legal structures of SPVs
created during securitization may be pierced or legally modified to
satisfy creditor and investor claims when their originating entities
become insolvent. In light of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and
ensuing corporate bankruptcies, the practice of disregarding corporate
formalities and substantively consolidating SPVs to satisfy creditors
started to gain traction.20 Specifically, the court decisions in In re LTV
Steel Co.,21 In re Pacific Lumber Co., 2 2 and In re General Growth
Properties, Inc.23 have directly impacted the ability of creditors and
investors to recover their investments.
Because they remain a popular investment structure, SPVs'
creditors and investors need to be aware of the risks that affect the
practice of securitization and SPVs' overall investment results. This
awareness of potential risks associated with SPVs allows investors and
creditors to make informed investment decisions. For legal counsel,
knowledge of probable risks and recent court rulings allows for
implementation of proper precautions and planning techniques to
mitigate current dangers associated with SPVs.
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I introduces the concept of
securitization, its importance in finance, and defines the scope of this
Article. Part II offers a detailed explanation about the process of
securitization, lists the parties involved and their duties, and presents an
overview of securitization's benefits and costs. Part III provides an indepth coverage of recent developments in SPV bankruptcy litigation.
Part IV summarizes the effects of case law on the practice of
securitization and suggests that SPV is not a bankruptcy proof or
removed vehicle. Part V provides multiple litigation strategies to
enhance an SPV's bankruptcy-remoteness based on properly structuring
the securitization process, implementing enhancements of external
credit, and conducting adequate due diligence. Finally, Part VI

bankruptcy-remote rather than bankruptcy-proof').
20. Matt Wirz & Mike Spector, Three-Way Battle Over Lehman Brothers Assets Intensifies,
DAILY BANKR. REv. (Dow Jones, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 26, 2011, https://www.fis.dowjones.com/
article.aspx?ProductlDFromApplication= 10&aid=DJFDBR0020110426e74q0002t&r=Rss&s=DJF

DBR (noting the creditor's desire to employ substantive consolidation technique to help asset
recovery).
21.

274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).

22. Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.),
584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).
23. 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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summarizes the challenges presented by SPVs to originators, creditors,
and investors.
II.

SECURITIZATION AND SPVS

Securitization is a viable alternative to the conventional issuance of
bonds.24 An entity seeking debt financing may issue a security backed by
a pool of loans or receivables, known as an ABS,2 5 which is created
through a securitization process.2 6 The collateral for asset-backed
securitization can emanate from two types of assets: existing receivables
and future receivables.27 Securitized assets are either commercial or
28 or subprime residential mortgage-backed securities
consumer ABS,
29
("MBSs").

24. A corporation, municipality, or government seeking to borrow money has an option to
issue bonds. See David W. Cornell & J. Gregory Bushong, The Use of Bonds in FinancialPlanning:
How to StructureAn Investment Portfolio to Meet Long-Term Needs, J. ACCT., May 1992, at 46, 4748 (defining bonds as fixed-income securities, where the bond contract, commonly called an
indenture, requires the borrower to make periodic payment of interest and to repay the principal at
maturity). See also Frank J. Fabozzi, The Structured Finance Market: An Investor's Perspective,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 2005, at 27, 27 (noting that after the secured bonds are issued, the
bondholder relies on the issuer to generate cash to repay the obligation); Stay Gaon, Essays in
Securitization 86-87 (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with
Columbia University) (noting that securitized ABS are different from bonds because they generally
achieve higher ratings, have a different sources of repayment, and have a different methods of
resolving financial distress).
25. Fabozzi, supra note 24, at 27. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.1101(c)(1) (2005) (defining ABS as "a
security that is primarily serviced by the cash flows of a discrete pool of receivables or other
financial assets, either fixed or revolving, that by their terms convert into cash within a finite time
period, plus any rights or other assets designed to assure the servicing or timely distributions of
proceeds to the security holders; provided that in the case of financial assets that are leases, those
assets may convert to cash partially by the cash proceeds from the disposition of the physical
property underlying such leases"). See also Kenneth M. Ayotte & Stay Gaon, Asset-Backed
Securities: Costs and Benefits of "Bankruptcy Remoteness" 2 (Oct. 11, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-813847 (stating that "ABS most resemble secured
debt").
26. FRANK J. FABozzI, BOND MARKETS, ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGIES 354-55, 378 (Donna
Battista et al. eds., 7th ed. 2010) (noting that this process excludes residential prime mortgage loans
and commercial mortgage loans).
27. Id. at 354 (referencing that securitization is based on receivable assets).
28. Id. at 355 (noting that commercial ABS are composed of trade receivables, equipment
leasing, franchise loans, operating assets, small business loans, and entertainment assets). See also
Richard & Kosiba, supra note 9, at 10 (noting that other receivables assets include "automobile
loans, outstanding credit card balances, student loans, small-business loans, lawsuit settlements, and
future revenue generated by royalties").
29. Richard & Kosiba, supra note 9, at 10 (stating that MBS "groups together first-mortgage
loans, termed home-equity loans, home-equity lines of credit, and tax liens placed on residential
property").
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The key participants in the securitization process include the
originator30 who is seeking to raise money, the SPV, and the servicer.
Additional parties that are involved in securitization are the investment
bankers, trustee, credit rating agencies, and investors.3 1 An originator is
a legal entity that has financing needs and possesses assets that are
appropriate for structured financing.32 Common originators are financial
institutions, insurance companies, automakers, airlines, computer
companies, mortgage companies, and other businesses that originate
receivables. 33 In securitization, originators create and often become the
servicer of the assets utilized as collateral for the ABS. 34 To obtain
structured financing, the originators must completely relinquish their
ownership and control rights in the assets.35
Servicers manage and maintain assets and the cash flows from an
ABS. 3 6 Servicers collect principal and interest payments on the assets
when they are due, pursue collection of delinquent accounts, and issue
trustee and certificate holders with reports concerning the portfolio of
assets sold or used as collateral.37 Servicers also ensure that the collected
cash is distributed in accordance with the financial agreement.38
ABS transactions additionally involve an investment banker who
underwrites the securities for the public offering or for private sale.3 9 In
the public offering, the underwriting bank buys securities for resale from
the SPV.40 However, if securities are sold privately, the bank acts only4 1as
parties.
an agent for the SPV by matching the seller with the interested
An SPV enables "the sale of... assets or... issuance of
collateralized debt instruments. '' 2 The SPV has three major functions in
securitization: (1) it is a pass-through vehicle that allows the originator's
assets to be securitized and sold to investors; (2) it provides protection
against the SPV becoming insolvent for investors of the securitized

30. Originators are also commonly referred to as sponsors or sellers. See FABOZZI, supra note
26, at 356.
31. See Richard & Kosiba, supra note 9, at 10. See also Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate
Reorganization of The Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., StructuredFinancing Techniques, 50
Bus. LAW. 527, 581 (1995) [hereinafter StructuredFinancingTechniques].
32. StructuredFinancing Techniques, supra note 3 1, at 529.
33. Id.at 530 tbl.1.

at 529.
34. See id.
35.

See id.

36. PAVEL, supra note 7, at 22.
37. Id.
38.
39.

StructuredFinancingTechniques, supra note 31, at 529.
PAVEL, supra note 7, at 25.

40. Id
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 23-24.
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assets; and (3) it protects the securitized assets from the originator's
creditors.43
An SPV must obtain a favorable credit rating to entice investors'
interest." Credit rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's Rating
Services, Duff & Phelps Corp., Fitch Ratings, Ltd., and Moody's
Investor Services, Inc. assign ratings to an ABS based on its risk. 45 In
issuance of an ABS, the default probability is not connected to an
issuer's creditworthiness but rather to the credit quality of the assets that
46
underlie the SPV's securities. As a result, the credit agencies rate an
ABS by measuring whether the SPV's assets can generate adequate cash
flows to pay the investors.47
The ABS rating is based on five general criteria: (1) the SPV's
default probability on its obligations, (2) the essence of the obligation's
provisions, (3) the effect of bankruptcy on the obligation, (4) the SPV's
quality of the assets, and (5) the transaction's structure.48 The credit

43. Kenneth N. Klee & Brendt C. Butler, Asset-Backed Securitization, Special Purpose
Vehicles and Other Securitization Issues, 35 UCC L.J. 23, 26 (2002). See also Thomas J. Gordon,
Securitization of Executory Future Flows as Bankruptcy-Remote True Sales, 67 U. CHi. L. REV.
1317, 1322-23 (2000) (noting that SPVs also serve three purposes: (1) allowing transformation of
originator's assets into liquid marketable securities; (2) protecting own investors from SPV
bankruptcy; and (3) protecting securitized assets from creditor claims).
44. Hyun Jin Lee, Essays on Asset Securitization, Bank Production Costs, and the Credit Card
Market 43 (Fall 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file
with University of California, Berkeley) ("The securitization process involves rating agencies since
ratings are essential for all securities not guaranteed by the U.S. government or government
sponsored agencies.").
45. See Elizabeth Devine, The Collapse of an Empire?:Rating Agency Reform in the Wake of
the 2007 FinancialCrisis, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 177, 183 (2011) (noting that Moody's
Investors Services, Inc., Standard & Poor's Rating Services, and Fitch Ratings, Ltd. control
approximately ninety-five percent of the rating agency market).
46. See Plank, supra note 2, at 1667.
47. See id. at 1662 ("The investment return on the securities depends on the receivables
themselves and does not depend upon the creditworthiness of the originator of the receivables or the
issuer of the securities." (footnote omitted)).
48. PAVEL, supra note 7, at 32. See also Jerome F. Festa, Introduction, in SECURITIZATIONS:
LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 1-1 (2011) ("The asset-backed security is normally rated to an
investment grade level by one or more rating agencies based on the strength of the underlying
assets, the amount of credit enhancement, and legal structure."); Elizabeth Smith-Avery, Equipment
Lease Asset-Backed Securities: Gaining Access and Better Pricing,J. EQUIP. LEASE FIN., Spring
2003, at 13, 14 (stating that rating agencies standards look at the following factors: "originator's
strength, underwriting standards, past performance, concentrations, pool characteristics, servicer's
quality and backup, residual cash flows and valuation, seasoning with a minimum of one payment,
[and] legal issues"); Tribar Opinion Comm., Opinions in the Bankruptcy Context: Rating Agency,
Structured Financing,and Chapter 11 Transactions, 46 Bus. LAW. 717, 720 (1991) (noting that
rating agencies "in determining whether to grant a rating based on the credit quality of the
independent credit support or the segregated asset pool, analyze proposed financings in terms of
both certainty of payment and timeliness of payment" and use legal opinions addressing the
structure of the transaction).
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ratings standardize and quantify the investment risks in the ABS
allowing the investor to compare the offered products to other
investments.49
To receive a high credit rating, an originator may employ services
of a credit enhancer, which employs internal and external measures to
reach the desired rating goal. 50 A well-structured transaction involving
quality collateral is likely to obtain a high credit rating. A high rating
enables the SPV to place the securities at a lower interest rate, 5 which
allows it to reserve a smaller amount of cash for repaying the debt.12 As
a result, the originator receives a higher purchase price for its assets
from the SPV, which lowers the originator's discount rate.53
With an ABS, the trustee serves as an intermediary between the
servicer and investors, and between the credit enhancer and the
investors.54 The trustee represents the interests of the bond classes by
monitoring compliance with covenants and enforcing specific remedies
allowed by the governing documents if there is a default.5 5 The trustee
also has responsibility "for determining the sufficiency of the various
reports made by the servicer to the investors and for passing the reports
on to the investors. 56 If the servicer withdraws or becomes unable to
perform its duties, a trustee must be willing and able to fulfill the
servicer's role.57
58
Investors are entities or individuals that acquire an ABS.
Depending on the nature of the transaction, investors may include
financial institutions, businesses, individual investors, and banks.
Regardless of the investor type, all rely on the credit rating issued by the
credit rating agencies when investing in SPV securities. 59

49. Gordon, supranote 43, at 1322. See also Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 136.
50. StructuredFinancingTechniques, supra note 31, at 533-34.
51.

Robert Stark, Viewing the LTV Steel ABS Opinion in Its ProperContext, 27 J. CORP. L.

211, 214 (2002). See also Lee, supra note 44, at 43 ("The rating agencies require additional credit
enhancement to be certain that the cash flows from the bundle of rights in a securitized issue are of
sufficient quality to meet the promised payments of interest and principal, should the underlying
loan default.").
52. Gordon, supra note 43, at 1322.
53. Id.
54. PAVEL, supranote 7, at 35.
55. FABOZZI,supra note 26, at 356.
56. PAVEL, supranote 7, at 36.
57. Id.
58. StructuredFinancingTechniques, supra note 31, at 529.
59. Stark, supra note 51, at 214.
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Benefits of Securitization

Securitization is an efficient form of capital market financing that
provides a myriad of benefits for financial firms, investors, participating
third parties, and the public. 60 Companies utilize securitization and
issuance of ABS to provide their investors with safety, 6' competitively
high returns, 62636
access to capital markets,63 and low funding costs. 4 SPVs
have also been used to facilitate transactions involving sales and
acquisitions of plants and equipment under long-term lease contracts and
funding of research and development activities.65
Originators benefit from securitization by being able to attract longterm funds more profitably than with conventional tools and by
accessing a new source of income by originating and servicing the
securitized assets.6 6 Some academics have referred to securitization as a
highly effective method of borrowing.6 7 Securitization permits isolation
of an ABS from the originator's credit risk 68 and allows the ABS to

60. See Kravitt, supranote 1, at 2. See also Patricia M. Dechow & Catherine Shakespeare, Do
Managers Time Securitization Transactionsto Obtain Accounting Benefits?, 84 ACCT. REV. 99, 99
(2009) ("Securitizations are a form of financing that has several advantages over traditional bank
financing.").
61. Enron Aside, supranote 17.
62. Id.
63. Schwarcz, supranote 11, at 151. See Aleksandar Nikolic, Securitization ofPatents and its
Continued Viability in Light of the Current Economic Conditions, 19 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 393,
403-04 (2009) ("Securitization is a system that can benefit all parties involved. Investors potentially
get a viable asset protected by the existence of a valid asset, originators get an upfront sum of
money to pursue their company goals, and the [SPV] becomes a new entity with ownership of cash
flows stemming from valid patents which it owns.").
64. As discussed by Fabozzi:
There are four principal reasons why a corporation may elect to raise funds via a
securitization rather than a corporate bond. They are:
1. the potential for reducing funding costs
2. to diversify funding sources
3. to accelerate earnings for financial reporting purposes
4. for regulated entities, potential relief from capital requirements ....
FABOZZI, supra note 26, at 358.
65. Al L. Hartgraves & George J. Benston, The Evolving Accounting Standardsfor Special
Purpose Entities and Consolidations, 16 ACCT. HoRIZONs 245, 246 (2002) (listing additional uses
of SPVs).
66. PAVEL, supra note 7, at 13. See also Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured
Creditors Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 249 & n.25, 250 (5th Cir. 2009)
(discussing how the originator retained the right to service the sold to SPV asset).
67. See Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory
Institutionalizationof Securitization,33 CON,N. L. REV. 199,230-31 (2000).
68. Walter Henry Clay McKay, Commentary, Reaping the Tobacco Settlement Windfall: The
Viability of Future Settlement Payment Securitization as an Optionfor State Legislatures, 52 ALA.
L. REV. 705, 715-16 (2001) (noting that securitization passes the risk while providing for "an
immediate infusion of cash").
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receive their own investment grade rating, which will be given
irrespective of the creditworthiness of the originator of the receivables.69
Asset securitization adds liquidity to unrated receivables that
enables them to be sold in the capital markets,70 which attracts investors
who might not be interested in the company's separate receivables to
purchase an ABS. 71 As a result, an ABS allows for inexpensive funding
for a company 72 whose credit rating may be lower than the credit rating
on its receivables.7 3 Securitization provides originators with a
moderately priced source of funds independent from an inelastic supply
of receivables. 74 Thus, securitization may be utilized to manage riskbased capital requirements imposed by financial institutions such as
banks and insurance companies.75
Additionally, for accounting purposes, securitization allows the
originator to remove assets and liabilities from its balance sheets.76 To
comply with the generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") the
transfer of assets in securitization must qualify as a sale under Financial
Accounting Standards No. 140 ("FAS 140"). 77 This allowed financial
69. Plank, supra note 2, at 1667 (suggesting that even large credit-worthy originators of
receivables utilize securitization to maintain favorable debt-equity ratios and to lower costs).
70. See OHC Liquidation Trust v. Credit Suisse (In re Oakwood Homes Corp.), 356 F. App'x.
622, 624 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing the use of securitization to increase company's liquidity). See
also Lee, supra note 44, at 42 (noting that pooling of assets increases liquidity).
71. See Mortensen v. AmeriCredit Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021 (N.D. Tex. 2000) ("If
the SPVs are bankruptcy remote from the originator, the debt will not carry the risk of delayed
payment or default that may be associated with debt issued from a leveraged originator. Therefore,
investors are willing to pay more for the less risky securities, which translates into a lower cost of
capital for the originator.").
72. Klee & Butler, supra note 43, at 24 ("Asset securitization is a species ofdisintermediation
inasmuch as it permits a company to acquire reduced-cost financing through the removal of
intermediaries, such as bank lenders, that previously stood between a company and the ultimate
source of money, the financial markets. Through asset securitization, a company avoids the
increased transaction costs charged by middlemen financial institutions. It also enables a company
to raise funds cheaply based on allocation of risks that are assessed by parties having the most
expertise, such as rating agencies.").
73. Nikolic, supra note 63, at 402 ("[l]nvestors will look to cash flow of the SPE and not the
creditworthiness of the originator to determine whether to invest.").
74. PAVEL, supra note 7, at 15.
75. Fabozzi, supranote 24, at 28.
76.

See ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS & SERVICING OF FIN. ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS

OF LIABS., Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140, 7, 9-11 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
2000). Compare securitization to secured financing. In secured financing, the originator preserves
the assets on its balance sheet along with any additional liability in the amount of the secured
financing. See Nikolic, supra note 63, at 408 (noting the appeal of securitization to companies
because it allows for "an off-balance sheet transaction").
77. Klee & Butler, supra note 43, at 29. "The basic idea of FAS 140 is that to achieve a 'true
sale' characterization for accounting purposes the transferor must surrender control of the
transferred assets or, in other words, structure the transaction so that the transferred assets are
separated from the transferor." Id.at 29-30. According to the Financial Accounting Standards
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companies to remove toxic assets from their balance sheets during the
2007-2009 recession in the United States. 78 For instance, by removing
unwanted risky assets from the balance sheets, insurance companies
lowered the amount of capital they needed to hold to cover the risk.79
Further, since the originator's and SPV's financial statements are not
consolidated, any debt incurred by the SPV does not appear on the
originator's consolidated balance sheet.8 0
Asset securitization may also help financial institutions manage
interest rate risk by removing unwanted items from their balance
sheets. 81 This removal directly benefits the financial company with an
appropriate legal risk management technique that may improve its
overall asset portfolio.82 Securitization can help to improve bank

Board:
A transfer of financial assets ... in which the transferor surrenders control over those
financial assets shall be accounted for as a sale to the extent that consideration other than
beneficial interests in the transferred assets is received in exchange. The transferor has
surrendered control over transferred assets if and only if all of the following conditions
are met:
a. The transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor-put presumptively
beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or other
receivership ....
b. Each transferee (or, if the transferee is a qualifying SPE..., each holder of its
beneficial interests) has the right to pledge or exchange the assets (or beneficial interests)
it received, and no condition both constrains the transferee (or holder) from taking
advantage of its right to pledge or exchange and provides more than a trivial benefit to
the transferor ....
c. The transferor does not maintain effective control over the transferred assets through
either (1) an agreement that both entitles and obligates the transferor to repurchase or
redeem them before their maturity ... or (2) the ability to unilaterally cause the holder to
return specific assets, other than through a cleanup call ....
ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS & SERVICING OF FIN. ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABS.,

Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140, 9 (emphasis omitted).
78. Kenneth E. Scott & John B. Taylor, Why Toxic Assets Are So Hardto Clean Up, WALL
ST. J., July 20, 2009, at A13. See also Pacholder High Yield Fund, Inc. v. Cucuz (In re Hayes
Lemmerz Int'l, Inc. Equity Sec. Litig.), 271 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1016 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (discussing a
company which created an SPV to "remove certain accounts receivable and corresponding reserves
for bad debt off its balance sheet").
79. See Dan Ozizmir, Securitization: Buzz or Real Solution?, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, July 24,
2006, at 14, 16 ("By selling risks to investors, insurance companies will no longer need to hold as
much capital.").
80. Food Holdings Ltd. v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.), 684 F. Supp. 2d
453, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[S]tructured transactions can be attractive means of raising capital
because ... the SPE's financial statements are not consolidated with those of the originator. Hence,
the debt incurred by the SPE does not appear on the originator's consolidated balance sheet.").
81. Fabozzi, supra note 24, at 28 ("A financial institution can securitize assets that expose the
institution to higher interest rate risk and retain certain customized parts of the asset securitization
transaction to attain an improved asset/liability position. In this respect, the financial institution
serves as both issuer and investor.").
82. See Lupica, supra note 67, at 210 (noting the benefits from the perspective of the
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profitability, 83 provide a bank with a competitive advantage in attempts
to increase market share, 84 and improve its asset-liability ratio. 85
Securitization may increase the liquidity of a bank loan portfolio by
facilitating the packaging and sale of otherwise illiquid assets to
interested third parties.86 Securitization can provide banks with an
inexpensive source of funds because it may allow avoidance of reserve
and capital requirements and deposit insurance premiums.87 Finally,
banks and their investors can benefit from the increased
liquidity and
88
risk diversification provided by asset securitization.
An ABS contains risk-transfer, credit-risk, and liquidity-generation
innovations. 89 An ABS permits the transfer of the price risk of a pool of
loans or receivables from the originators to investors, alteration of
exposure to interest rate risk, and creation of securities with different
liability-matching profiles. 90 Through an ABS, an originator can
redistribute multiple levels of risk through tranching and third party
guarantees, and thereafter pass the credit risk to the interested

originator, which "include improved liquidity, increased diversification of funding sources, a lower
effective interest rate, improved risk management and accounting-related advantages"). See also
Michael S. Gambro & Scott Leichtner, Selected Legal Issues Affecting Securitization, 1 N.C.
BANKING INST. 131, 132 (1997) ("If the originator funds its portfolio of assets with liabilities
having differing maturities and does not otherwise hedge its funding obligations, the originator
assumes the risk that its cost of funding the assets will not match the earnings attributable to such
assets. The securitization of a pool of assets can alleviate this problem by allowing the originator to
perfectly match the duration of its assets and its liabilities.").
83. See Everette D. Hull & Leslie Annand, Time to Jump on the Securitization Bandwagon?:
As the Asset-Backed Securities Market Rolls on, Bankers Should Consider Its Potential, A.B.A.
BANKING J., Oct. 1987, at 137, 137.
84. Id. at 138 (noting that if a bank's loan origination capabilities exceed funding growth,
securitization permits bank to expand loan volume faster than deposit growth).
85. Lee, supra note 44, at 45 (stating that "securitization may be used to better manage
interest rate risk by improving a bank's asset-liability mix").
86. Richard & Kosiba, supranote 9, at 10.
87. PAVEL, supra note 7, at 16.
88. See Lee, supra note 44, at 11 (stating that securitization provides "banks with means for
low cost funding and risk diversification").
89. Fabozzi, supra note 24, at 28 ("Price risk-transferring innovations provide market
participants with efficient means for dealing with price or exchange rate risk. Reallocating the risk
of default is the function of credit risk-transferring instruments. Liquidity-generating innovations do
three things: (1) increase the liquidity of the market, (2) allow borrowers to draw on new sources of
funds, and (3) allow market participants to circumvent capital constraints imposed by regulations
and rating agencies.").
90. See id.
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purchasers. 91 Thus, when properly implemented, asset securitization

results in:
*
*
*

securities whose liquidity is greater than that of an
unsecuritized portfolio of loans or receivables,
borrowing from ultimate investors who would not ordinarily
want to hold a portfolio of loans or receivables, and
reduction by depository institutions of their capital
92
requirements by transferring assets off their balance sheets.
B.

Costs of Securitization

Despite its benefits, the process of securitization carries several
costs. First, securitization of assets and creation of SPVs entails
transactional costs such as registration fees, attorneys' fees, costs
associated with credit enhancements, and rating agency fees. 93 An SPV's

formation may take significant start-up time,94 and after the formation
phase is over, operational expenses are incurred on a regular basis.
Second, securitization can lead to abusive transactions.95 Enron

Corporation ("Enron") enabled such problems when it compromised the
independence of its SPV transactions.96 Enron created over 3000 SPVs,
many of which were designed for the purpose of asset securitization.97

91. Id. See also Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil: Examining the Role of Securitization:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Sec. & Ins. & Inv. of Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs,
110th Cong. 94 (2009) (testimony of Kurt Eggert, Professor of Law, Chapman University School of
Law) (commenting on the utilization of strips, often to referred to as tranches, in securitization and
stating how tranches are used to define priority in repayments due to risk characteristics). Professor
Kurt Eggert gave an example of how "one tranche might have the right to the first repayment of
principal until the claims of that tranche are satisfied," while another tranche "might not be entitled
to any payment until the rights of all other tranches have been satisfied." Id.
92. See Fabozzi, supra note 24, at 28. See also Lee, supra note 44, at 42-43 (noting that
claims against assets are often set "into tranches with differing rights to the cash flows, which
increases the market value of claims sold to investors").
93. Plank, supra note 2, at 1668. See also Devine, supra note 45, at 184 (stating that average
cost of rating agency services "ranged between $30,000 and $100,000" and that "[i]n some
instances, Wall Street paid as much as $1 million for ratings").
94. Jennifer S. Myers, Asset Securitization Goes International, METROPOLITAN CORP.
CoUNs., July 1995, at 23, 23.
95. Neal F. Newman, Enron and the Special Purpose Entity. Use or Abuse? The Real
Problem-The Real Focus, 20, 26 (Tex. Wesleyan Law Sch., Paper No. 1165, 2006), available at
http:/law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5550&context-expresso
(noting the negative
effects Enron had on SPVs).
96. Jenny B. Davis, The Enron Factor: Experts Say the Energy Giant's Collapse Could
Trigger Changes in the Law That Make it Easierto Snare Professionals,A.B.A. J., Apr. 2002, at
40,42.
97. Klee & Butler, supra note 43, at 3 1; Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and
Bankruptcy Reform: Deador Dormant?, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 101, 102 (2002).
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Enron retained the risks it was trying to relinquish by failing to maintain
a necessary level of corporate independence from its SPVs. 98 Subsequent
investigations revealed that Enron created SPVs to minimize losses on
its financial statements, artificially increase the value of the assets,
accelerate profits, and avoid incurring debt on its balance sheet. 99 As a
result, Enron's abuse of the process and fraudulent practices undermined
billions of dollars of investments in the ABS transactions. °°
Third, the protections that securitization provides for investors do
not always safeguard subprime borrowers.'0 1 Securitization allows thinly
capitalized lenders and brokers to enter the subprime market, where
some originators commit loan abuses perhaps because they perceive
inadequate regulation, and low capital operations that allow them to be
judgment-proof. 0 2 Securitization increases the price of subprime loans
require premium returns for investing in risky
because 0investors
3
markets.
Finally, creation of a new regulation is likely to increase
compliance costs associated with securitization, restrict its use, and limit
its array of previously noted benefits. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act")
exemplifies how new laws and regulations may change an existing
business practice. 10 4 The Dodd-Frank Act forces issuers to have "[s]kin
98. Davis, supra note 96, at 42 (noting how Enron compromised independence of SPVs).
99. Klee & Butler, supra note 43, at 31 (citing WILLIAM POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
ENRON CORP. 4, 68, 78, 97 (2002)). Klee & Butler described Enron's SPVs as follows:
In a typical SPV transaction, Enron would transfer its own stock to an SPV in
exchange for a note or cash. Enron would also guarantee the SPV's value. The SPV, in
turn, would hedge the value of a particular investment on Enron's balance sheet, using
the transferred Enron stock as the principal source of payment. Enron's faulty
assumption, however, was that the risk of having to pay on the guarantees was minimal
based on the strength of its stock. However, when Enron's stock price subsequently
crashed, the SPV's value also fell. This confluence triggered the guarantees, which in
turn further reduced Enron's stock value, triggering additional guarantees. The SPVs
lacked sufficient assets to perform its hedge, when.., the value of both Enron's
investment and Enron's stock price dropped simultaneously. Additionally, these drops in
value caused the SPVs to breach the 3% (now 10%) independent equity requirement for
non-consolidation, which in turn brought the SPV's debt onto Enron's balance sheet.
These transactions were initially beneficial to Enron for accounting purposes, because
they allowed it to recognize the value of the loan immediately and avoid recognizing on
an interim basis any future losses.
Id. at 31-32 (footnotes omitted).
100. Id.at 32.
101. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
PredatoryLending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2041 (2007).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Moorad Choudhry & Gino Landuyt, Securitization: Restoring Confidence in the
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in the game" by making them retain an economic interest of at least five
percent of the credit risk of assets that are conveyed through the ABS
issuance.105 The law further prohibits securitization and removal of the
amount associated with the five percent credit risk retention. 10 6 The
possibility of future regulation to heighten control over the financial
should be a consideration for all parties
industry's handling of ABS
07
involved in securitization.'
C. The Legal Structure and SPVs' Bankruptcy-Remoteness
In securitization, the assets to be securitized are transferred on an
absolute basis to an SPV, 0 8 a separate legal entity, which thereafter sells
claims on the assets to outside investors in turn for liquid funds.' 0 9 This
absolute transfer calls for a complete divestiture of ownership, a true
sale, after which the originator no longer retains any rights, title, or
interest in the property.l"0
Market, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Summer 2009, at 60, 64 ("[A] recessionary environment brought on
by a banking crisis and credit crunch" had a negative effect on the investors which "will impact
structured finance products such as ABS ahead of more plain vanilla instruments. Market
confidence is key to re-starting markets such as that for ABS.").
105. See Brief Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer ProtectionAct,
U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING & URB. AFF., http://banking.senate.gov/public/-

files/0701 10 DoddFrankWallStreetReform comprehensive_summaryFinal.pdf (last visited
Mar. 1, 2012).
106. See id.
107. See Lois L. Weinroth & Richard L. Fried, Securitization Provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Fall 2010, at 38, 38 (noting that the remainder of the Dodd-Frank Act
provisions "will not become effective until after rulemaking by applicable federal banking agencies,
the U.S. SEC, and other regulatory authorities").
108.

VINOD KOTHARI, SECURITIZATION: THE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT OF THE FUTURE 11

(2006).
109. Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 25, at 3. See also In re Innkeepers USA Trust, 448 B.R. 131,
142 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stating that "in a securitization, the investors' relationship is with the
special purpose vehicle holding the assets ...[where the] right to payment comes from the cash
generated by the assets, not from the originator of the assets itself." (citation omitted)).
110. Structured FinancingTechniques, supra note 31, at 541-42. This transaction is different
from a secured debt sale, in which assets are sold by the originator to the third-party investors
directly. See Lupica, supra note 10, at 599-601. Securitization is also different from factoring. In
factoring, the factor realizes profits by buying receivables directly from clients at a discount, while
securitization involves the creation of a bankruptcy-remote SPV that purchases receivables from the
originator and issues ABS into the capital markets. See Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 144 (noting the
differences between securitization and factoring). Schwarcz notes:
Factoring... involves.., the purchase of accounts receivable ...by the factor from the
party (called the "client") with whom it has a factoring contract. The client assumes all
risks of nonpayment of the receivable except the "financial inability of the account
debtor (customer) to pay." . ..The factor agrees to pay on a monthly basis for purchased
The customer is immediately
receivables at a rate computed under the contract ....
notified of the sale of the receivable to the factor and is instructed to make all payments
directly to the factor.
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1. Securitization
There are five steps in a single SPV securitization process. First, the
originator must identify a pool of assets with foreseeable income that it
desires to securitize."' The income is required to assure principal and
interest payments." 2 After an appropriate asset pool is selected, the
originator isolates and prepares to transfer these assets to the SPV." 3
The second step involves creation of a subsidiary conduit entity, an SPV,
which purchases the identified assets for securitization." 4 In the third
step, contemporaneous with creating an SPV, the originator attempts to
make SPV bankruptcy as remote as possible. 15 Fourth, the originator
transfers the identified and isolated assets to the SPV.11 6 In the fifth and
final step, the SPV issues an ABS to pay the originator for the purchase
of the assets.'' 7
Companies seeking to ensure that their securitization transaction is
a true sale often sell and transfer assets to the first subsidiary SPV,
which is called an intermediate SPV. 1 8 Next, the intermediate SPV sells
the assets to the ABS-issuing SPV." t 9 To avoid any potential risk of
being associated with the originator's bankruptcy, the asset transfers are
structured as true sales. 2 ° The intermediate SPV has specific restrictions
on its activities such as being only allowed to engage in purchasing,
owning, and selling originator's assets and is restricted from declaring
Id. (citation omitted).
111. Richard & Kosiba, supra note 9, at 10 ("The originator pools together a diverse group of
receivables of varying durations, maturities, interest rates, and risk ratings, and moves them to a
special purpose entity (SPE), or trust, established by the originator for this specific purpose only.").
112. Klee & Butler, supra note 43, at 26.
113. See id. See also KOTHARI, supra note 108, at 11.
114. Klee & Butler, supra note 43, at 26. See also Food Holdings Ltd. v. Bank of Am. Corp.
(In re Parmalat Sec. Litig.), 684 F. Supp. 2d 453, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Structured finance
transactions typically involve an 'originator' that transfers one or more assets to an SPE for the
purpose of raising capital.").
115. See Jeffrey E. Bjork, Comment, Seeking Predictability in Bankruptcy: An Alternative to
Judicial Recharacterization in Structured Financing, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 119, 124 (1997)
("Securitization allows the Seller to 'isolat[e] a defined group of assets and creat[e] a structure for
those assets that is legally separate from all others,' thereby insulating the assets from the effects of
the Seller's bankruptcy." (footnote omitted)).
116. See Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 135 ("After identifying the assets to be used in the
securitization, the originator transfers the receivables to a newly formed special purpose
corporation, trust, or other legally separate entity--often referred to as a special purpose vehicle, or
'SPV.').
117. Klee & Butler, supra note 43, at 26.
118.

See ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS & SERVICING OF FIN. ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS

OF LIABS., Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140, 46 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
2000) (describing the two-step process). See also FABOZZI, supra note 26, at 357 (noting that an
intermediate SPV may also be referred to as depositor).
119. FABOZZI,supra note 26, at 357.
120. Klee & Butler, supra note 43, at 27.
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be conducted as a sale for
voluntary bankruptcy. 121 The second sale may
22
accounting purposes and not as a true sale.'
Multiseller Securitization Conduit ("MSC") 23 is another approach
that originators may utilize to benefit from an SPV. 12 4 Through use of
MSCs, rather than multiple SPVs, originators can lower their
transactional costs and sell their assets to an existing SPV. 125 An MSC
provides some protection against substantive consolidation if an
originator files for bankruptcy. 126 However, MSCs are not as
bankruptcy-remote as SPVs, since MSCs involve originators who may
commence involuntary bankruptcy
become their creditors and
127
SPV.
the
against
proceedings
2. Legal Structure
SPVs assume various legal forms depending on the jurisdiction of
their incorporation. In the United States, an SPV generally takes the
form of a limited liability corporation ("LLC"), a trust, or a limited
liability partnership ("LLP"). 28 In Europe, an SPV can be organized as
an LLC, a limited purpose corporation under domestic or offshore law
with a charitable trust owner, while in Canada an SPV may take the form

121. FABozzI, supra note 26, at 357 & n.2.
122. See Angela Petrucci, Note, Accounting for Asset Securitization in a Full Disclosure
World, 30 J. LEGIS. 327, 333 (2004) (noting that a second transfer might not be judged to be a true
sale at law). See also Klee & Butler, supra note 43, at 27 (summarizing that the first asset transfer to
the SPV in a true sale can have the sole purpose of protecting the assets from the originator's
bankruptcy, while the second transfer can be used to provide internal credit enhancements to
second-tier investors).
123. See Gordon, supra note 43, at 1325 (stating that a "merger of SPVs creates a 'multiseller
securitization conduit' ('MSC')"). See also Zem-shun Adam Chen, Note, Securitizing Microcredit:
The Implications of Securitizationfor MicrocreditInstitutions' Human Rights Missions, 39 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 757, 779 (2008) (stating that MSC is a "securitization technique [that] allows
several originators to pool their assets into a single SPV").
124. See Neil Campbell & Balbir Bindra, Securitization in Asia, INT'L. FIN. L. REV., Oct. 2002
(Supp.), at 25, 25 (noting the popularity of multiseller conduits).
125. See Adam Grant, Note, Ziggy Stardust Reborn: A Proposed Modification of the Bowie
Bond, 22 CARDOzo L. REV. 1291, 1310 (2001) ("The primary benefit of the multiseller
securitization conduit is that it allows originators who would not traditionally be able to afford the
transaction costs of one-off securitizations to engage in securitization." (footnote omitted)). See also
Malcolm S. Dorris & Anna E. Panayotou, Multi-Seller Commercial Paper Conduits and
Securitization: A BriefHistory and Current Challenges, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Winter 2004, at 21,
21.
126. Klee & Butler, supra note 43, at 27.
127. Id. at 40-41 (discussing In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, 714-15 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1997), where the creditors brought an involuntary petition against an SPV).
128. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, THE JOINT
FORUM: REPORT ON SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES 65-66 app. 2 (2009) [hereinafter BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS].
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of a charitable trust. 129 Other common legal forms used in other
jurisdictions include an unincorporated entity and a multi-user structure
such as a protected cell company. 130
3. Bankruptcy-Remoteness
An SPV is a bankruptcy-remote entity with the limited purpose of
facilitating the securitization 3 1 To ensure an SPV's bankruptcyremoteness when its corporate parent
becomes insolvent, certain
32
protective measures are implemented.
First, securitization permits an originator to obtain funds at reduced
cost when a lender secures the loan with assets that are transferred from
the originator to the SPV.133 Securitization allows the lender to exclude

its collateral from the originator's estate.134 Thus, in the event of the
originator's bankruptcy, the automatic stay should stop the investors and
creditors from
foreclosing on the assets due to the difference in asset
35
ownership.
Second, additional protections can be implemented through proper
documentation associated with creating, operating, and transacting with
an SPV. These documents expressly limit the SPV's authority and
purpose to owning and managing the collateral, entering into the
transaction closing documents, and engaging in activities restricted to
those necessary or incidental to financing. 36 As a separate legal entity,
an SPV must maintain its own corporate books,
records, and accounts,
37
and observe all other corporate necessities.
129. Id. at 65 app. 2.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 47 app. 1.
132. See In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 05-10203 (MFW), 2008 WL 1702095, at *7
(Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 10, 2008). An SPV is formed with a purpose "to isolate the financial assets
from the potential bankruptcy estate of the original entity, the borrower or originator" by
"adequately insulat[ing] from the consequences of any related party's insolvency, thus reducing the
likelihood of the SPE's being involved in a bankruptcy proceeding." Id. (quoting David B. Stratton,
Special-PurposeEntities and Authority to File Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2004, at 36,
36).
133. In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 280 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
134. Id.
135. See A. Brent Truitt & Bennett J. Murphy, Bankruptcy Issues in Securitizations, in
SECURITIZATIONS: LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 2-6 (2011) (noting that after the securitization

process the assets will belong to the SPV and not the originator).
136. Stark, supranote 51, at 216.
137. See Paloian v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 619 F.3d 688, 695-96 (7th Cir. 2010) (providing an
example where the court stated that the SPV was not independent of the debtor because it did not
have the usual attributes of a bankruptcy-remote vehicle). In Paloian, the court stated that the SPV
was not bankruptcy-remote because it did not have an office, a phone number, a checking account,
or stationery, all of its letters were written on the debtor's stationery, it did not prepare financial
statements or tax returns, took only a small cut of the proceeds to cover costs of operation, and the
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To protect against bankruptcy, an SPV must be limited in its
acquisition of any additional debt to those that carry the same security
rating as the ABS. 138 An SPV's debt must be limited to ABS and
obligations to credit enhancers and liquidity providers, 139 or incurred in
the ordinary course of business activities related to ownership and
management of the collateral. 140 Documents specify that assets
transferred to the SPV must be free of liens and other interests that favor
parties external to the securitization. 141 The documents must also
indicate that for as long as the ABS are outstanding, the SPV is
prohibited from dissolving, liquidating, consolidating, merging, or
142
selling assets.
An SPV's documents must impose certain corporate governance
restrictions. For instance, the documents must require the SPV to
employ an independent director who is unaffiliated with the SPV or the
originator. 143 The provisions must make it very difficult for the SPV to
file for voluntary bankruptcy by requiring a unanimous consent of all
members of the SPV's board of directors and a favorable vote of the
independent director. 144 After an ABS issuance, any amendment to the
SPV's originating documents is required to have the approval of
investors and confirmation from rating agencies that such an amendment
would not result in a downgrade or withdrawal of qualification rating. 145
Finally, an SPV becomes bankruptcy-remote if it is structured in a
way that it will not be subject to substantive consolidation if the
operating company files for bankruptcy protection. 146 The purpose of the
structure is to ensure that the
financial assets of the SPV will not be part
47
of that bankruptcy estate. 1

debtor continued to list the entity's accounts receivable as its own corporate asset. Id.
138. See PAVEL, supranote 7, at 24.
139. Structured FinancingTechniques, supranote 31, at 554.
140. Stark, supranote 51, at 216.
141. Structured FinancingTechniques, supranote 31, at 555.
142. Stark, supranote 51, at 216.
143. See W. Rodney Clement, Jr. & H. Scott Miller, General Growth: Special Purpose Entities
(Barely) Survive FirstBankruptcy Test, PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr. 2011, at 31, 31-32 ("There are
two distinct aspects to an SPE: separateness of identity and the role of an independent director.").
144. See id. (stating that "the purpose of an independent director is to prevent a borrower from
filing for bankruptcy in a mere attempt to gain leverage; the independent director is supposed to
provide for a rational, independent review").
145. Stark, supra note 51, at 216.
146. Id. at212.
147. Ayotte & Gaon, supranote 25, at 3.
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D. True Sale Doctrine
In a securitization's true sale, the originator must absolutely assign,
transfer, and divest of all ownership rights, title, or interest in its assets
to the SPV.148 All securitization transactions "are premised on the idea
that the transfer of the underlying financial asset will be recognized as a
'true sale' to the" SPV.149 However, the factual determination of whether
the assignment was a loan or a true sale may provide any court with a
difficult challenge. 5 °
Courts have broad discretion in ruling on whether a transaction
constitutes a true sale or just a loan. 5' As a result, depending on the
particular jurisdiction or judge, the transfer of assets to the SPV may be
upheld as a true sale or declared a loan. 52 Due to these broad
discretionary powers, which have been freely exercised by bankruptcy
53
courts, there is a lack of certainty in the securitization industry.
In determining whether a transfer of assets or receivables
constitutes a true sale, courts consider neither a prescribed list of factors,
nor a consistently assigned weight of certain factors over others. Instead,
the courts consider different factors and give those factors different
weights on a case-by-case basis. 5 4 Additionally, the courts apply a
148. LaSalle Nat'l Bank Ass'n v. Paloian, 406 B.R. 299, 315 n.11, 341 (N.D. Ill. 2009) ("At a
minimum, a true sale must be a sale in substance, as opposed to a mere transfer for security.").
149. Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc. v. Desnick (In re Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc.),
360 B.R. 787, 848 (Bankr. N.D. 111.2007).
150. See LaSalle Nat 'l Bank Ass 'n, 406 BR. at 315 n. 11, 340 ("The use of a 'true sale' in the
specific context of a securitization is a relatively recent development, and a dearth of case law has
made the requirements of a 'true sale' of assets to a special purpose entity somewhat uncertain.").
See also In re Commercial Loan Corp., 316 B.R. 690, 700 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) ("Whether to
deem a transaction a sale or a loan when a financial asset-a right to payment-has changed hands
is an old legal problem for which there has never been an easy solution.").
151. LaSalleNat'lBankAss'n,406 B.R. at 341.
152. Bjork,supra note 115, at 126.
153. Id.
154. See id. See also Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse, 14
GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 287, 290 (1991) ("[C]ourts do not rely upon any universally accepted set of
factors .... "). For example, the language of the parties' contract has mattered little to some courts.
See Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 543 (3d Cir. 1979). To
others, it has been more or less dispositive. See Hatoffv. Lemons & Assocs., Inc. (In re Lemons &
Assocs., Inc.), 67 B.R. 198, 209-10 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986). Some courts find critical the purchaser's
retention of some recourse against the seller. See Ratto v. Sims (In re Lendvest Mortg., Inc.), 119
BR. 199, 200 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990). Others deem it merely relevant or choose to ignore it
altogether. See, e.g., Major's Furniture Mart, Inc., 602 F.2d at 544-45; Carter v. Four Seasons
Funding Corp., 97 S.W.3d 387, 398 (Ark. 2003). With no "discernible rule of law or analytical
approach" evident from the decisions, a court "could flip a coin, and find support in the case law for
a decision either way." Robert D. Aicher & William J. Fellerhoff, Characterizationof a Transferof
Receivables as a Sale or a Secured Loan upon Bankruptcy of the Transferor, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J.
181, 206-07 (1991). The absence of any set legal analysis, along with the annoying tendency of
decisions to turn on their facts, makes predicting the outcome of a loan/true sale dispute nearly
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"totality of the circumstances test" by looking at the intent and the
relationship between the parties. 55 As a result, some courts may rely
entirely on the language of the parties' contract, where others may
regard that language as inconsequential. 156 As a general inquiry, the
courts regularly consider three issues:
1. Did the parties intend for the transaction to be a sale or to
create only a security interest in favor of the transferor?
2. Regardless of intent, have the risks and benefits of ownership
truly been transferred? Does the transferor or the transferee
bear the risk of loss to the assets being transferred? The
greater the recourse to the transferor, the more likely the
transfer will not be upheld as a true sale.
157
3. Did the transferee acquire an interest in identifiable assets?
In In re Jersey Tractor Trailer Training, Inc.,' 58 the court
summarized factors considered by other courts as follows:
1. Language of the documents and conduct of the parties.
2. Recourse to the seller.
3. Seller's retention of servicing and commingling of proceeds.
4. Purchaser's failure to investigate the credit of the account
debtor.
5. Seller's right to excess collections.
6. Purchaser's right to alter pricing terms.

impossible. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part III): Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the
Subcomm. on Commercialand Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 189-90
(1999) (statement of Seth Grosshandler, Esq., Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton)
(observing that the legal analysis is "highly subjective" and that issuing "true sale opinion[s]" in
connection with some transactions is therefore "extremely difficult, costly, and in a few cases,
impossible to render" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
155. In re CommercialLoan Corp., 316 B.R. at 700 (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating
that when "[c]onfronted with loan/true sale questions, courts typically adopt something resembling a
'totality of the circumstances' test, declaring that the sale determination depends on the intent of the
parties and requires an examination of the parties' relationship").
156. See id.
157. Asset Securitization, [2011] 4 Debtor-Creditor L. (MB) § 41.04[1], at 41-36. See also
Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of FinancialAssets, 52 BUs.
LAW. 159, 159 (1996) ("Transfers of financial assets in which the parties state that they intend a
sale, and in which all the benefits and risks commonly associated with ownership are transferred for
fair value in an arm's-length transaction, are easily identifiable as sales. The issue becomes
complicated if the buyer retains recourse to the seller such that less than all of the risks of ownership
are transferred.").
158. Wawel Savings Bank v. Jersey Tractor Trailer Training, Inc. (In re Jersey Tractor Trailer
Training, Inc.), Bankr. No. 06-12743 (MBK), 2007 WL 2892956 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2007),
af'd, Bankr. No. 06-12743 (MBK), 2008 WL 2783342 (D.N.J. July 15, 2008).
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7. Seller's retention of right to alter or compromise unilaterally
the terms of the transferred assets.
159
8. Seller's retention of right to repurchase asset.
If the court determines that the sale was "untrue," it can reclassify
the sale as a secured loan for the purpose of creditors' rights. 160 The
consequences of such a ruling may be devastating for the SPV investors,
creditors, and lenders. If the transfer of assets is not classified as a true
sale, the bankruptcy court has the discretion to "delay payments to the
transferee, or to force a liquidation of assets and repayment of claims,
thereby depriving investors of the continuing benefits of their
investment.' 16 1 Further, if the sale is classified as a loan, the originator's
bankruptcy would allow the bankruptcy court to impose a stay on62 the
SPV's activities associated with obtaining access to the receivables.1
III.

SPV LITIGATION

In the event of the bankruptcy of its originator, an SPV should be
fully protected from creditors of the seller of the collateral. 163 After the
collateral is transferred to the SPV in the true sale, the SPV, not the
seller, holds legal and equitable title to the property.' 1 Even if the seller
remains the servicing agent after the sale, the SPV is considered to own
legally purchased assets. 165 Thus, if the seller subsequently declares
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court should not have justification to
penetrate the SPV to recuperate the collateral or obtain cash from the
collateral. 166 However, the theory of an SPV's remoteness from
bankruptcy proceedings has not been confirmed absolutely by the courts.
Ambiguity exists as to when an SPV structure can be pierced or
modified to allow recovery for investors and creditors because the major
legal decisions show that SPVs are bankruptcy-remote, not bankruptcy
167
proof.
159. Id.at *7 (citing Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 154, at 186, 191-94).
160' See Principal Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 144, 165 (2006) (quoting JAMES
M. PEASLEE & DAVID

Z. NIRENBERG, FEDERAL

INCOME TAXATION OF

SECURITIZATION

TRANSACTIONS 61 (3d ed. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Id. (quoting PEASLEE &NIRENBERG,supra note 160, at 61).
162. Nikolic, supranote 63, at 403.
2009) (noting that
163. LaSalle Nat'l Bank Ass'n v. Paloian, 406 B.R. 299, 336-37 (N.D. 111.
securitization isolates "the financial assets of the special purpose entity in the event that the
operating company files for bankruptcy").
164. See DVI Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nat'l Med. Imaging, LLC (In re DVI, Inc.), 305 B.R. 414,
417 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (citation omitted).
165. Id.at 417-18 (citation omitted).
166. FABOZZi, supra note 26, at 365.
167. See Robert K. Rowell, Single Purpose Entities (SPEs) Offer Lenders Security & Leverage,
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In re LTV Steel Co.

As "one of the largest manufacturers of wholly-integrated steel
products in the United States," the LTV Steel Co. ("LTV") produced
"flat rolled steel products, hot and cold rolled sheet metal, mechanical
and structural tubular products, and bimetallic wire.' 68 In October 1994,
Abbey National ("Abbey"), a large financial institution located in the
United Kingdom, commenced an ABS transaction with LTV. 169 LTV
began by forming a wholly owned subsidiary, LTV Sales Finance Co.
("Sales Finance"). 70 LTV and Sales Finance entered into an agreement
in which LTV would continuously sell all of its rights in accounts
receivable to Sales Finance, while Abbey obtained a security interest in
those receivables in exchange for a $270 million loan to Sales
Finance. 171
In 1998, LTV entered into an ABS financing agreement in which
LTV created LTV Steel Products, LLC ("Steel Products"). 17 2 LTV then
entered into an agreement with Steel Products in which it sold all of its

"right[s], title and interest[s] in its inventory to Steel Products on a
continuing basis." 173 Steel Products gave a security interest in its
inventory to Chase Manhattan Bank ("Chase")
and other banking
74
institutions in exchange for a $30 million loan.'
On December 29, 2000, LTV along with its forty-eight subsidiaries,
filed voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcies.175 On its bankruptcy filing date,
as part of the first day hearings, LTV sought an interim court order
permitting it to use cash collateral, which consisted of accounts

receivable and inventory that were owned by Sales Finance and Steel
Products. 176 LTV argued that without ability to use the cash collateral, it

3

DEBT , July/Aug. 2005, at 40, 40.

168. In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 279-80 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (noting that this is
not the first time LTV filed for bankruptcy relief). LTV "previously filed a voluntary Chapter 11
petition in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on July 17, 1986.... [LTVI
successfully emerged from Chapter II on June 28, 1993." Id. at 280.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. "Abbey National [was] not involved in this ABS facility, and it had no interest in prepetition inventory allegedly owned by Steel Products." Id.
175. Id. at 279-80 (noting that at the time of the bankruptcy, LTV employed approximately
17,500 individuals and was responsible for providing medical coverage and other benefits to
approximately 100,000 retirees and their dependents).
176. Id. at 280. Neither Sales Finance nor Steel Products were a debtor in this proceeding. Id.
Abbey was not present at the hearing; Chase was present at the December 29, 2000 hearing. Id. at
280-81.
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would be forced to cease operations. 77 The bankruptcy court determined
that the interim order allowing use of the accounts receivable sold to
Sales Finance and of the inventory sold to Steel Products was necessary
to permit LTV to continue its business operations. 178 The bankruptcy
court also determined that the interim order adequately protected
Abbey's and its creditors' interests in the179cash collateral and that it was
in the best interest of all parties involved.
On February 5, 2001, the bankruptcy court ruled on Abbey's
emergency motion for modification of the interim order that allowed
LTV the use of cash collateral.180 Abbey's key request for an order
modification consisted of three arguments: (1) it was denied due process;
(2) the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enter an interim order
because the accounts receivable that constituted Abbey's collateral were
not the property of LTV's bankruptcy estate; and (3) even if accounts
receivable were the property of LTV's bankruptcy estate, Abbey's
interests were not adequately protected because pre-petition accounts
receivable were diminishing at a rapid rate and soon would be
depleted. 181
The bankruptcy court found that Abbey had received adequate
notice of the cash collateral hearing and that its due process rights were
not denied. 82 The bankruptcy court also declined to accept Abbey's
177. Id. at 280.
178. Id. at 281. Cash collateral consisted of accounts receivable and inventory. Id at 280.
179. Id. at 281. On its filing date, LTV and Chase reached an agreement regarding the interim
order, which allowed LTV to use the cash collateral. Id. Since Chase could not obtain Abbey's
consent to the form of the order, Chase did not formally consent to the entry of this order. Id. Chase
negotiated some of the order's terms and did not raise an objection to its entry by the bankruptcy
court. Id. Consequently, the bankruptcy court entered an order, summarized as follows:
1. Recognition that there is a dispute between Debtor and the secured lenders of Sales
Finance and Steel Products as to whether the transactions between Debtor and those
entities were true sales or disguised financing vehicles;
2. An order requiring the secured lenders to turn over to Debtor the cash proceeds of the
inventory and receivables which are to be used to provide working capital for Debtor;
3. Recognition that in the event the Court determines these transactions to be true sales,
the secured lenders whose cash collateral was used will be entitled to administrative
expense claims against the estate;
4. Adequate protection was provided to the secured lenders in the form of senior liens on
the inventory and receivables and weekly interest payments to the lenders at pre-petition
non-default rates.
Id.
180. Id. at 278-79.
181. Id.at282.
182. Id. at 283. Abbey argued that its due process rights were violated as "it did not have
'effective notice' of the cash collateral hearing and that Chase..., as Abbey National's agent,
supported the entry of the interim order without its consent." Id. The bankruptcy court recognized
Abbey's meaningful right to a hearing and its significant interest in the cash collateral. Id. Although
Abbey was not present at the cash collateral hearing, the court noted that Abbey had actual notice of
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argument that the accounts receivable were not part of LTV's estate.183
Abbey contended that the transaction between LTV and Sales Finance
was a true sale, which meant LTV sold its interest in the accounts
receivable to Sales Finance, and no longer had any interest in the
receivables.' 84 Accordingly, Abbey argued that since LTV had no
remaining interest in the 185
accounts receivable, they could not be part of
estate.
bankruptcy
LTV's
In its reasoning, the bankruptcy court relied on Section 541(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code. 186 Section 541(a) states that upon the filing of
bankruptcy petition an estate is created, which consists of "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case. 187 The filing of a Chapter 11 petition creates a very broad
estate, where "property may be included in [the] Debtor's estate 1even
if
88
[the] Debtor does not have a possessory interest in that property."'
Because LTV's business operations required it to purchase, melt,
mold, and cast various metal products, the bankruptcy court found that
LTV retained equitable interest in the cash collateral.' 89 The bankruptcy
court concluded that LTV had equitable interest in the inventory and
accounts receivable that were part of its bankruptcy estate.' 90 Further,
the bankruptcy court noted that Abbey's relief from the interim cash
collateral order would be "highly inequitable" for LTV's business and its
employees.' 9'

the hearing. Id. The first notice was provided in the form of an e-mail sent by a Chase employee to
Abbey on December 28, 2000. Id. at 280. The second notice came in the form of a telephone call
made from a Chase employee to Abbey on December 29, 2000. Id. at 280-81. Additionally, the
bankruptcy court stated that LTV had given advance notice of its intention to file for bankruptcy
protection to Chase, Abbey's agent, in the week prior to December 29, 2000. Id. at 281. The
bankruptcy court further noted that Abbey had a full and fair opportunity to appear before the court
and object to the entry of the order, and could not be unduly surprised by the entry of the interim
order. Id. at 284. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court stated there is no basis for granting relief from
the interim order on Abbey's due process argument. Id. at 285.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. The bankruptcy court found Abbey's argument regarding the true sale to be "circular,"
because, as Abbey admitted in its pleadings and in oral argument, the ultimate issue of whether
LTV actually sold the receivables to Sales Finance was a fact-intensive issue that could not be
resolved without extensive discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Id. Thus, the court could not
determine whether the accounts receivable were part of LTV's bankruptcy estate until an
evidentiary hearing could be held. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Id. (citing United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-06 (1983)).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 285-86.
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The court also stated that the interim order was necessary to enable
LTV to operate and meet its obligations to its employees, customers,
retirees, and creditors. 9 2 Modification of the interim order would put all
of these stakeholders at risk because it might allow Abbey to exercise its
state law rights as a secured lender to look to the collateral in satisfaction
of its debt. 193 The bankruptcy court stated that such a result "would put
an immediate end to [LTV's] business, would put thousands of people
out of work, would deprive 100,000 retirees of needed medical benefits,
and would have more far reaching economic effects on the geographic
areas where [LTV] does business."' 194 The bankruptcy court stated that
modification of the interim order would shut down LTV's business, thus
leading to the termination of thousands of its employees, eliminating
benefits to its 100,000 retirees, and negatively affecting geographic areas
where LTV conducts business. 95 Accordingly, LTV's equitable interest
in the cash collateral and the high inequity that might result from a
modification of the current order was sufficient to stay the bankruptcy
court's prior entry of the interim order and to deny Abbey's request."'
In its third and final argument, Abbey contended that its collateral
was not adequately protected because its pre-petition accounts receivable
were depleting at a rate of $10 million per day and that all accounts
receivable would be consumed in a short period.' 97 Additionally, Abbey
98
stated that the interim order had diminished the value of its liens.'
Again, the bankruptcy court disagreed with Abbey. First, the court found
Abbey's contention that its collateral was being consumed and depleted
at $10 million per day to be "disingenuous."' 99 Second, the bankruptcy
court noted that pre-petition accounts receivable were being used by
LTV to purchase and manufacture more steel, which in fact should
increase the value of post-petition accounts receivable and inventory, in
which Abbey had a secured interest. 200 Finally, the bankruptcy court
found that Abbey's interest and collateral were adequately protected by
an equity cushion and by the current terms of the interim order.20 '

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 286.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 284, 286.
Id. at 286.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 287.
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The case was settled. Settlement included a summary finding that
LTV's securitizations were true sales.2 °2 However, the court's decision
to permit LTV to use the cash flows prior to the settlement sends a
warning to investors.20 3 It sets a persuasive precedent for other
originators to argue when they operate near or in insolvency and have
sold assets they require for operations, an attempt for a successful
reorganization to an SPV might be mandated.2°
The assets that the parent-originator sells to the SPV, and the assets
the originator retains for its operations, are important to investors. The
critical considerations are the value of the collateral remaining for
operations and the originator's ability to convert this collateral into cash
as needed.205 In LTV's case, the assets sold to the SPV consisted of
accounts receivable and inventories, which included "raw materials to be
manufactured into salable goods. 20 6 The only remaining assets owned
by the originator were large physical assets, such as an aged steel mill,
that were hard to convert into cash through liquidation and were not the
type of assets banks wanted to take as collateral. 0 7 As a result, LTV put
itself in a situation where it had no easily marketable assets to obtain the
cash that it needed for reorganization, and its liquid assets had been sold
to the SPV.20 8 The LTV case demonstrates that despite financially
damaging effects for the SPV's investors, a bankruptcy court may allow
the parent-originator to use liquid assets it previously sold to a
bankruptcy-remote SPV to prevent negative consequences that the
originator's bankruptcy would have on its employees, retirees, and
regional economics.2 °9

202. FABOZZI, supranote 26, at 365.
203. See id.
204. See Stark, supranote 51, at 224.
205. Id.at 215.
206. Id. at 227.
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. See Klee & Butter, supra note 43, at 57-58 ("The LTV case illustrates the stress that can
be placed on a securitization transaction if any of the following are true: (i) the debtor has no or
inadequate sources of working capital other than the collateral and/or its cash flow; (ii) the collateral
includes operating assets required for the continuation of the debtor's business, not just pure
financial assets (i.e. inventory); and (iii) cessation of the debtor's business would result in the loss
of many jobs and create other widespread personal hardships."). See also Frank J. Fabozzi & Vinod
Kothari, Securitization: The Tool of Financial Transformation (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working
Paper No. 07-07), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-997079 ("For investors in the securities
issued in a securitization, however, what was troubling about [the LTV] case is that the court
decided to permit LTV to use the cash flows prior to the settlement." (footnote omitted)).
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B. Doctrineof Substantive Consolidation
The doctrine of substantive consolidation originated from the
common law concept of equity.2t 0 This equitable power given to the
bankruptcy courts arises from the broad equity jurisdiction conferred by
Section 105 of the bankruptcy code. 2 t ' Similarly, consolidations may
also be accomplished through utilization of Section 5020) and Section
542(a).2 1 2 The bankruptcy court has the equitable power to order
substantive consolidation of separate corporate entities to reach assets
that are needed to satisfy a related corporation's debts.2 t3 Bankruptcy
cases may also be consolidated for administrative purposes.21 4
Substantive consolidation can combine paralleling claims of
shareholders against the associated organizations, use combined assets
of the companies to satisfy any obligations, eliminate intercompany
claims, and combine the creditors of the two companies to form the
creditors' committee needed to approve reorganization plans that might
enable the firm to emerge from bankruptcy.2 t5 In effect, substantive
consolidation combines separate legal entities and assigns their
cumulative assets and liabilities to the resulting organization, which
separate debtors
allows creditors' claims against either of the previously
16
to be combined against the consolidated survivor.
Although substantive consolidation is regarded as "an extreme and
unusual remedy,, 21 7 courts have allowed consolidation between the
debtor and a non-debtor entity.28 Interconnected corporate structures
210. Principal Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 144, 164 n.41 (2006) (citation
omitted). See also In re Cent. European Indus. Dev. Co., 288 BR. 572, 576 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003)
("[S]ubstantive consolidation is one of 'the bankruptcy court's general equitable powers ...
(emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)).
211. See PrincipalLife Ins. Co., 70 Fed. Cl. at 164 n.41.
212. See In re Cyberco Holdings, Inc., 431 B.R. 404, 424 (Bankr. W.D.Mich. 2010) (stating
that consolidations may "now ...be accomplished through the application of actual Code
sections-to wit, Sections 542(a) and 5020)-as opposed to through amorphous notions of equity
and dubious interpretations of Section 105").
213. Soviero v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 328 F.2d 446, 447 (2d Cir. 1964) ("A bankruptcy court
has the power to adjudicate summarily rights and claims to property which is in the actual or
constructive possession of the court." (quoting Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97, 98 (1944) (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
214. SeeFed. R. Bankr. P. 1015(b).
215. Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.),
584 F.3d 229, 249 (5th Cir. 2009). See also In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc., 390 B.R. 140,
161 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) ("Typically, substantive consolidation takes a form in which separate
entities are merged into a single survivor, which is then left with the assets and liabilities of all.").
216. PrincipalLife Ins. Co., 70 Fed. Cl. at 164 n.41.
217. Gandy v. Gandy (In re Gandy), 299 F.3d 489, 499 (5th Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted).
218. Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
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have led the courts to use their equitable and flexibility powers to order
limited to substantial substantive consolidation. 21 9 Because the doctrine
of substantive consolidation is based on equity, the judicially developed
standards control whether substantive consolidation requests should be
granted or denied in any given case.22° Since the substantive
consolidation analysis employed by courts is highly fact-specific and
on a case-by-case basis, this area of the law
decisions are rendered 221
remains highly volatile.
1. The Elements Test
The Elements Test is one of three tests developed by the courts for
determining whether two entities may be substantively consolidated. The
Elements Test employs factors that are often used by courts in their
decision of whether to pierce the corporate veil. Because a corporation is
a separate entity, its shareholders, management, and other related entities
are generally not responsible for the corporate liabilities.222 If a corporate
form is abused by individuals or entities, an exception in the law
disallows liability protection provided by the incorporation process.223
Piercing of the corporate veil by the court exposes to liability those who
disregard the corporate form to commit wrongdoing for their own
benefit. 224 In substantive consolidation, the courts utilize the following

elements for "piercing the corporate veil test":
1. [p]arent corporation owns all or a majority of the capital stock
subsidiary,
2. parent corporation and subsidiary have common directors and
officers,
219. In re Colfor, Inc., No. 96-60306, 1997 WL 605100, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 4,
1997). See also White v. Creditors Serv. Corp. (In re Creditors Serv. Corp.), 195 B.R. 680, 691-92
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996) (indicating the authority and ability to substantively consolidate); In re
Standard Brands Paint Co., 154 BR. 563, 566-67 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993).
220. See In re Gyro-Trac (USA), Inc., 441 B.R. 470, 487 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2010) ("The doctrine
of substantive consolidation is based strictly on equity; as a result, courts have broad discretion in
determining whether to substantively consolidate bankruptcy cases." (citation omitted)).
221. See In re Crown Mach. & Welding, Inc., 100 B.R. 25, 27-28 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989);
Comm. on Structured Fin. & Comm. on Bankr. & Corp. Reorg. of The Ass'n of the Bar of the City
of N.Y., Special Report on the Preparationof Substantive Consolidation Opinions, 64 BUS. LAW.
411, 414 (2009) [hereinafter Special Report] (noting that despite the "decisions in Owens Corning
(2005), Augie/Restivo (1988), and Auto-Train (1987)," much law remains unsettled due to the new
cases). See also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating substantive consolidation analysis requires "a searching review of the record, on a case-bycase basis").
222. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Lay-Coin, Inc., 580 F.3d 602, 610 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted).
223. Id. (citation omitted).
224. Id.
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3.
4.

parent corporation finances subsidiary,
parent corporation is responsible for the incorporation of the
subsidiary,
5. subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital,
6. parent corporation pays salaries or expenses or losses of
subsidiary,
7. subsidiary has substantially no business except with parent
corporation or no assets except those conveyed to it by parent
corporation,
8. parent refers to subsidiary as such or as a department or
division,
9. directors or executives of subsidiary do not act in the interests
of subsidiary, but take directions from the parent,
10. the formal legal requirements of the subsidiary
as a separate
22 5
and independent corporation are not observed.
Other courts used the following elements for piercing of the
corporate veil to determine if substantive consolidation should be
allowed:
1. the degree of difficulty in segregating and ascertaining
individual assets and liability,
2. the presence or absence of consolidated financial statements,
3. the profitability of consolidation at a single physical location,
4. the commingling of assets and business functions,
5. the unity of interests and ownership between the various
corporate entities,
6. the existence of parent and inter-corporate guarantees on
loans,
7. the transfer 22of
assets without formal observance of corporate
6
formalities.
This second group of elements has become popular in recent case
law.
The court's decision to allow substantive consolidation is not
228
governed by a single element.
Even an assembly of elements
suggesting the existence of a substantial relationship among the debtors
227

225. In re Tureaud, 45 B.R. 658,662 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1985), aff'd, 59 B.R. 973 (N.D. Okla.
1986). See also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hogan (In re Matter of Gulfco Inv. Corp.), 593 F.2d 921,
928-29 (10th Cir. 1979); Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940).
226. In re Vecco Constr. Indus., Inc., 4 B.R. 407, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980). See also In re
E'Lite Eyewear Holding, Inc., No. 08-41374, 2009 WL 349832, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Feb. 5,
2009); In re Optical Techs., Inc., 221 B.R. 909, 913 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998); In re Donut Queen,
Ltd., 41 B.R. 706, 709 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Manzey Land & Cattle Co., 17 B.R. 332, 337
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1982).
227. In re E'Lite Eyewear Holding, Inc., 2009 WL 349832, at *3.
228. Id.
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is only one of the grounds required for substantive consolidation.22 9
Sometimes the court requires proof of additional elements to establish
substantive consolidation. 230 However, the presence of a common theme
involving additional elements such as poor recordkeeping, commingling
of assets or liabilities, and the existence of inter-affiliate transactions that
make it hard to establish correct distribution of assets and liabilities will
likely result in an order for substantive consolidation.2 31
For instance, the Second Circuit in Chemical Bank New York Trust
Co. v. Khee2 32 ordered substantive consolidation because all creditors
would have realized benefits upon consolidation. 233 In its ruling, the
court stated:
[W]here the interrelationships of the group are hopelessly obscured
and the time and expense necessary even to attempt to unscramble
them so substantial as to threaten the realization of any net assets for
a rough approximation
all the creditors, equity is not helpless to reach
2 34
of justice to some rather than deny any to all.
When there is an absence of opposition and consolidation would
promote reorganization rather than liquidation, the court may order
substantive consolidation without evidence of entanglement or inability
to separate assets and liabilities.2 35
In addition to a commingling of assets and liabilities,
supplementary factors may need to be present. These factors may
include "failure to comply with corporate formalities in connection with
interaffiliate transfers, third party transactions, or conduct of directors
and shareholder meetings, inadequate differentiation among affiliated
entities in dealing with and representations made to third parties, or
with any other formal conduct required by corporate
noncompliance
236
law."
229. Id.
230.
231.

Id.
Id. at *34 (citations omitted).

232. 369 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966).
233.
234.

Id. at 847.
Id. However, interests of creditors who would be adversely affected by substantive

consolidation must be protected as long as separate accounting can be accomplished. 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 105.09[2][a], at 105-96 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011)
(citing Flora Mir Candy Corp. v. R. S. Dickson & Co. (In re Flora Mir Candy Corp.), 432 F.2d
1060, 1063 (2d Cir. 1970)).
235. See In re Vecco Constr. Indus., Inc., 4 B.R. 407, 410-12 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
105.09[2][a], at 105-97. See also
236. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 234,
Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Ass'n, Ltd., 935 F.2d 245, 250 (1 1th Cir. 1991) ("Additional factors
that could be presented in some cases include: (1) the parent owning the majority of the subsidiary's
stock; (2) the entities having common officers or directors; (3) the subsidiary being grossly
undercapitalized; (4) the subsidiary transacting business solely with the parent; and (5) both entities
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2. The Balancing Test
The second approach used to determine substantive consolidation
by courts is a balancing of equities, which looks at the impact the
consolidation may have on the creditors.237 This test helps the court
evaluate a proposed substantive consolidation to determine whether the
cost-benefit analysis of keeping the parent corporation separate and
distant from the SPV is preferred to consolidating the two
organizations. 238 A court must inquire to ensure that the benefits of
substantive consolidation outweigh the harm it causes the opposing
parties. 239
The court in Eastgroup Properties adopted a four-part test to
determine if substantive consolidation should be allowed. 140 Under this
test, substantive consolidation should be permitted only if: (1) there is a
substantial identity between the entities to be substantively consolidated;
(2) consolidation is essential to evade some harm or to realize some
benefit; 24 1 (3) the objecting creditor did not rely on the separate credit of
one of the entities to be consolidated and thereby would not be
prejudiced by consolidation; 242 and (4) the objecting creditor would be
prejudiced by substantive consolidation or by an objecting creditor who
has made a showing that consolidation benefits heavily outweigh the

disregarding the legal requirements of the subsidiary as a separate organization." (citing Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085, 1093 (1st Cir. 1983)).
237. In re Cyberco Holdings, Inc., 431 B.R. 404, 430 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (noting that
the "[c]ourt must be convinced that a harm or prejudice to creditors will occur in the absence of
substantive consolidation by weighing the equities favoring consolidation against the equities
favoring the debtor remaining separate from the entities and the individual" (quoting White v.
Creditors Serv. Corp. (In re Creditors Serv. Corp.), 195 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996))).
238. See Nickless v. Avnet, Inc. (In re Century Elecs. Mfg.), 310 B.R. 485, 489 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 2004).
239. Woburn Assocs. v. Kahn (In re Hemingway Transp., Inc.), 954 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1992)
("Since consolidation can cause disproportionate prejudice among claimants required to share the
debtors' pooled assets, the party requesting substantive consolidation must satisfy the bankruptcy
court that, on balance, consolidation will foster a net benefit among all holders of unsecured
claims." (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
240. EastgroupProps., 935 F.2d at 249 ("The D.C. Circuit has elaborated a standard, which
we adopt today, by which to determine whether to grant a motion for substantive consolidation.").
241. Id. (citations omitted).
242. Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.), 810 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir.
1987) ("[A] creditor may object on the grounds that it relied on the separate credit of one of the
entities and that it will be prejudiced by the consolidation.").
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harm. 243 This balancing test has been adopted
implicitly 245 by several courts.
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explicitly 244 or

3. The Alter Ego Test
An originating corporation and an SPV may also be substantively
consolidated under the alter ego theory. A corporation is "an entity
separate and distinct from its owners or shareholders. 24 6 However, to
protect the public and in the interest of fairness and equity, the existence
of a corporate form should be ignored when the corporation merely acts
as its owner's alter ego.247 When a corporation exists solely to serve as
its owner's alter ego, the courts will disregard the entity and deal with
the substance of the transaction as if the corporation never existed.24 8
The grounds for disregarding the corporate form under the alter ego
test are similar to those under the substantive elements tests, and are
determined by state law.249 While the courts do not have a determinative,
unilaterally applied criterion, a combination of some or all of the
following ten factors are generally used to determine if the corporation is
a mere alter ego of its shareholders and owners: (1) "the absence of the
formalities and paraphernalia that are part and parcel of the corporate
existence, i.e., issuance of stock, election of directors, keeping of
corporate records and the like"; (2) "inadequate capitalization"; (3)
"whether funds are put in and taken out of the corporation for personal
rather than corporate purposes"; (4) "overlap in ownership, officers,
243. EastgroupProps., 935 F.2d at 249 (noting "that [the] objecting creditor 'has looked solely
to the credit of its debtor' and 'is certain to suffer more than minimal harm as a result of
consolidation' constitutes a defense to substantive consolidation" (footnote omitted) (quoting In re
Snider Bros., Inc., 18 B.R. 230, 238 (D. Mass. 1982))).
244. See In re The Leslie Fay Cos., 207 B.R. 764, 780 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Steury,
94 B.R. 553, 554 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988); In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d at 276; In re Baker &
Getty Fin. Servs., Inc., 78 B.R. 139, 142 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); Holywell Corp. v. Bank of N.Y.,
59 B.R. 340, 347 (S.D. Fla. 1986), appeal dismissed, Miami Ctr. Ltd. P'ship v. Bank of N.Y., 838
F.2d 1547 (11 th Cir. 1988); In re DRW Prop. Co. 82, 54 B.R. 489, 495 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); In
re Donut Queen, Ltd., 41 B.R. 706, 709 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re F.A. Potts & Co., 23 B.R.
569, 572 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Lewellyn, 26 B.R. 246,251 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1982).
245. See In re Silver Falls Petroleum Corp., 55 B.R. 495, 498 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985)
(considering "[w]hether the benefits of consolidation outweigh the harm to creditors .... ). See
also In re J.L. Helms, 48 B.R. 714, 717 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985) (finding that balancing interests is
another important factor in determining if substantive consolidation is appropriate); In re N.S.
Garrott & Sons, 48 B.R. 13, 18 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1984) (adopting Snider Bros. principles as
important factors); In re Luth, 28 B.R. 564, 567 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983) (citing the test from Snider
Bros. as another "element").
246. Flynn v. Greg Anthony Constr. Co., 95 F. App'x 726, 733 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Quinn v.
Butz, 510 F.2d 743, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
247. See id. at 733-34 (quoting Quinn, 510 F.2d at 758).
248. Id. at 733.
249. Id. at 734.
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directors, and personnel"; (5) "common office space, address and
telephone numbers of corporate entities"; (6) "the amount of business
discretion displayed by the allegedly dominated corporation"; (7)
"whether the related corporations deal with the dominated corporation at
arms length"; (8) "whether the corporations are treated as independent
profit centers"; (9) "the payment or guarantee of debts of the dominated
corporation by other corporations in the group"; and (10) "whether the
corporation in question had property that was used by other of the
corporations as if it were its own. '5 0 Courts have used the alter ego
analysis in combination with other factors such as fraud and
commingling of assets and liabilities to justify and order substantive
consolidation.25'
C. In re Pacific Lumber Co.
In In re Pacific Lumber Co., 252 the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of

Appeals addressed the possibility of substantive consolidation of special
purpose vehicles into parents for purposes of paying debts of the
bankrupt parent corporation. 3 The bankruptcy involved six affiliated
entities (the "Debtors") whose main businesses were growing,
harvesting, and processing redwood timber (collectively, the
"Timberlands").2 5 4 The bankruptcy court procedurally consolidated and
jointly administered the Debtors' cases.255 The appeal brought by The
250. Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir.
1991). See also IBP, Inc. v. Yeager & Sullivan, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-362 PS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20961, at * 19-20 (N.D. id. Oct. 12, 2004) ("In deciding whether the plaintiff has met its burden of
proof, the Indiana Supreme Court requires consideration of eight factors: (1) undercapitalization; (2)
absence of corporate records; (3) fraudulent representation by corporation shareholders or directors;
(4) use of the corporation to promote fraud, injustice or illegal activities; (5) payment by the
corporation of individual obligations; (6) commingling of assets and affairs; (7) failure to observe
required corporate formalities; or (8) other shareholder acts or conduct ignoring, controlling, or
manipulating the corporate form.").
251. See Lumax Indus., Inc. v. Aultman, 669 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1995). See also Cashman
Scrap & Salvage LLC v. Bois D'Arc Energy, Inc., 413 F. App'x 758, 763 (5th Cir. Feb. 22, 2011)
(noting that "courts have held that 'fraud or deceit' can justify piercing the corporate veil in an alterego case" (emphasis omitted)); Dusharm v. Elegant Custom Homes, Inc., 302 F. App'x. 571, 572
(9th Cir. 2008); Offenbacher v. Ahart, No. 07-CV-326-BR, 2009 WL 523097, at *7 (D. Or. Feb. 25,
2009) ("Commingling of assets constitutes improper conduct for purposes of piercing the corporate
veil.").
252. Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.),
584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009).
253. Id. at 249-50.
254. Id. at 236. (The Debtors were "involved in the growing, harvesting, and processing of
redwood timber in Humboldt County, California [and] filed separate Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petitions on January 18, 2007, in the Southern District of Texas (a venue [that is] not known for its
redwood forests).").
255. Id.
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Bank of New York ("Indenture Trustee") 25 6 only concerned the
reorganization of principal debtors Pacific Lumber ("Palco") and Scotia
Pacific ("Scopac"). 2 7 Palco owned and operated a sawmill and a power
plant.258 Marathon Structured Finance ("Marathon"), one of Palco's
creditors, held a secured claim against Palco's assets.259
Scopac was a Delaware SPV, which was wholly owned by Palco.260
Although Palco and Scopac maintained separate corporate structures,
they were an "integrated company., 26' One of Scopac's three directors
sat on Palco's board of directors, and both companies had the same chief
262
operating officer, chief financial officer, and general counsel.
In 1998, Palco transferred ownership of more than 200,000 acres of
the Timberlands to Scopac, which facilitated the sale of $867.2 million
26
in notes secured by prime redwoods and other Scopac assets. 63 Palco
retained the sole right to harvest Scopac's timber, which Palco then
processed and sold to various buyers. 26 Scopac was to repay its
noteholders with Palco's proceeds from the sales of timber. 265 At the
time of Palco's bankruptcy filing, Scopac owed noteholders
approximately $740 million in principal and interests.266
Two plans for reorganization were ultimately proposed to the
bankruptcy court.2 6 ' At the plan confirmation stage of the bankruptcy
case, the court held that the plan proposed by Marathon and Mendocino

256. Id.Bank of New York represented the noteholders in the bankruptcy cases, although some
of the noteholders retained separate legal counsel and were named appellants. Id.at 236-37.
257. Id.at 236. The court noted that:
The other four debtors were Britt Lumber Company, Inc., a manufacturer of fencing and
decking products; Scotia Inn, Inc., operator of the inn in Scotia, California; Salmon
Creek, LLC, a holding company owning roughly 1,300 acres of timberland; and Scotia
Development Corp., LLC, a development corporation for exploring and facilitating
development opportunities with respect to commercial, industrial, and residential
properties in California and Texas. These four entities and Scopac are all wholly owned
by Palco.
Id. at 236 n.2.
258. Id. at 236.
259. Id.Marathon's secured claim was about $160 million including pre and post-petition
financing. Id. Marathon estimated that Palco's assets were worth only $110 million at the time of
the bankruptcy filing. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at237.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 236.
264. Id.at 237.
265. Id.
266. Id.("Scopac also owed $36.2 million to Bank of America on a secured line of credit with
a right to payment ahead of the Noteholders.").
267. Id.One plan was proposed by Indenture Trustee and the other by Marathon and MRC, a
competitor of Palco. Id.
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Redwood Company ("MRC") was confirmable, while rejecting
Indenture Trustee's plan.268 The court held that Indenture Trustee's plan
only covered the Scopac assets and was a plan of liquidation rather than
reorganization, while the plan proposed by Marathon and MRC
("MRC/Marathon plan") sought to reorganize all of the Debtors. 269 The
MRC/Marathon plan proposed dissolution of all six entities, cancellation
of inter-company debts, and creation of two new entities, Townco and
Newco. 270 The newly formed Townco would have almost all of Palco's
assets, while Newco would possess the Timberlands and the sawmill
assets. 271 The MRC/Marathon plan also proposed to contribute $580
million to Newco to pay claims against Scopac.2 72 Marathon offered to
convert its secured claim of $160 million into equity for full ownership
in Townco and fifteen percent ownership in Newco, and a new note for
the amount of the sawmill's working capital.273 MRC proposed eightyfive percent ownership of Newco along with its right to manage and run
the company.274 These proposals were accepted by the bankruptcy court
and the reorganization plan was confirmed.275
The Indenture Trustee and certain noteholders appealed the
bankruptcy court's decision confirming the Chapter 11 reorganization
plan.276 On appeal, the Indenture Trustee challenged three elements of
268. Id.
269. Id. at 237 & n.3 ("The [Indenture Trustee's] plan provided for a six-month period to
market and sell Scopac's assets. As evidence of the plan's feasibility, the Indenture Trustee solicited
a 'stalking horse' bid for $603 million, but the bankruptcy court found that the bid's term sheet
contained numerous contingencies. Further, even the Indenture Trustee did not accept the term
sheet, which, the court found, suggested the bid's unreliability. The court also found no evidence
that the bidder, were it to win, was capable of operating the Timberlands or complying with a
multitude of environmental regulations."). The Indenture Trustee did not appeal the bankruptcy
court's rejection of its plan. Id. at 237.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 238 ("The plan created 12 classes, seven of which were eligible to vote, and four of
which contained claims against Scopac. Class 5 proposed to pay Bank of America, the sole class
member, $37.6 million, consisting of the principal ($36.2 million), accrued post-petition interest,
unpaid fees, and approximately $1 million in default interest paid over 12 months, thus impairing
the class. Class 6 proposed to pay the Noteholders' secured claim the value of their collateral and a
lien on proceeds from pending unrelated litigation against the state of California, which the parties
refer to as the Headwaters Litigation. Class 8 proposed to pay unsecured claims against Scopac by
former employees and trade vendors not previously deemed 'critical,' but these amounts were
exposed to ongoing litigation regarding assumption and rejection of executory contracts, thus
impairing the class. Class 9 was tailored to pay Scopac's remaining general unsecured claims,
consisting of the Noteholders' deficiency claim for over $200 million with a recovery estimated as
unknown."' (footnotes omitted)).
276. Id at 236. It should be noted that the debtor, Scopac, was initially joined in the appeal, but
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the reorganization plan: treatment of its security interests, the plan's
confirmation procedures, and specific plan terms.277 In relation to SPV
treatment in bankruptcy proceedings, Indenture Trustee argued that the
MRC/Marathon plan created a substantive consolidation of Scopac and
Palco.278
In its ruling, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
substantive consolidation "is of special concern" in cases involving
[SPVs] such as Scopac because of their intended bankruptcy-remote
structure. 2 79 The court held that Indenture Trustee failed to prove that
substantive consolidation occurred, because Indenture Trustee's
allegations that unsecured Palco claims were paid with Scopac assets
subject to its lien were insubstantial to constitute substantive
consolidation.2 8 ° Other evidence of substantive consolidation based on
the erroneous contention that the plan commingled inter-company
administrative claims also failed to persuade the court.2 8'
In its opinion, the court noted that the SPV structure is designed to
decrease the likelihood that the originator's insolvency will affect the
SPV's assets, which serve as collateral for issued notes.282 However, the
court left open the possibility that a court may substantively consolidate
an SPV and the originating entity, using the value of the investors'
collateral to satisfy the originator's debts.283 In the court's opinion, such
substantive consolidation of the SPV with its originator will have a
negative effect on investors' confidence in the practice of
securitization.284
was dissolved as part of the reorganization plan and moved to be dismissed. Id.at 236 n.1.
277. Id.at 239. The bankruptcy court found that the MRC/Marathon plan did not effect a
substantive consolidation. Id.at 249.
278. Id.at 239 ("The issues raised are that the confirmed MRC/Marathon reorganization plan:
(1) violates the absolute priority rule by paying junior Palco and Scopac creditors with the
Noteholders' collateral; (2) is not 'fair and equitable' because the plan sold the Timberlands
collateral without providing the Noteholders a right to credit bid; (3) values the Noteholders'
collateral too low and by an improper judicial process; (4) creates an illegal substantive
consolidation of Scopac and Palco; (5) fails to pay inter-company administrative priority claims in
cash; (6) artificially impaired the claim owed to Bank of America and illegally gerrymandered the
voting classes of unsecured claims in Classes 8 and 9; (7) discriminates unfairly in its treatment of
the Noteholders' Class 9 deficiency claim; and (8) includes unauthorized third-party release and
exculpation provisions.").

279. Id.at 249 n.25.
280. Id. at 249-50.
281. Id. at 250.
282. Id.at 249 n.25.
283. Id. ("Nevertheless, there is a danger that a court will substantively consolidate the two
entities, using the value of the investors' collateral to satisfy the originator's debts.").
284. See id.
("If courts are not wary about substantive consolidation of special purpose entities,
investors will grow less confident in the value of the collateral securing their loans; the practice of
securitization, a powerful engine for generating capital, will become less useful; and the cost of
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The effect of substantive consolidation can be significant for
investors, debtors, and other parties involved, as is evident in In re
Pacific Lumber Co. 285 The investment in a separate bankruptcy-remote
SPV can be undone by the courts, resulting in a common pool of assets
and liabilities of an insolvent originator.286 Insuch a case, there is a clear
risk of a complete loss of the invested capital.28 7 Substantive
consolidation may eliminate inter-company claims, combine entities for
purposes of reorganization, combine assets and liabilities on the
common balance sheet, and eliminate duplicative claims of joint and
several liability and guarantees.2 88 Once entities are consolidated, it is
almost impossible to untangle them. 289 As a result, debtors and investors
may end up in a costly fight with the consolidated originator and/or SPV
and each other in order to receive the return of their loaned or invested
funds.290
D. In re General Growth Properties, Inc.
The General Growth Properties, Inc. ("GGP") was a publicly traded
real estate investment trust ("REIT") and a parent company of
approximately 750 wholly owned Debtor and non-Debtor subsidiaries,
joint venture subsidiaries, and affiliates (the "GGP Group"). 291 The GGP
Group's properties were managed from its Chicago, Illinois
headquarters, and it directly employed about 3700 people, exclusive of
those employed at the various property locations.292 The GGP Group's
primary business was shopping center ownership and management, and
capital will increase.").
285. See id. at 249.
286. See id.
287. Id. at 249 n.25.
288. Klee & Butler, supra note 43, at 62. See also Eastgroup Props. v. S.Motel Ass'n, Ltd.,
935 F.2d 245, 248 (11 th Cir. 1991); In re Cooper, 147 B.R. 678, 682 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992); In re
Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 84 B.R. 315, 320 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988), rev'd sub nom, Union Say.
Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking, Co.), 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988).
289. Neil Cummings & Martin Zohn, Debtors Face Rising Costs ifOwens Coming Upheld,
INT'L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 2005, at 40, 40.
290. See id.
291. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). The court called
GGP Group's structure "extraordinarily complex." Id.at 48. GGP was a general partner and ninetysix percent owner of GGP Limited Partnership ("GGP LP"), the company through which the GGP
Group's business was primarily conducted. Id.at 48 & n.9. The other four percent was owned by
outside parties. Id.at 48 n.9. The GGP LP controlled directly or indirectly three other entities:
GGPLP, L.L.C., The Rouse Company LP ("TRCLP"), and General Growth Management, Inc.
("GGMI"). Id. at 48. GGP LP, GGLP, L.L.C., and TRCLP were each debtors, while GGMI was a
non-debtor affiliate that provides management services to the GGP Group, the joint ventures, and
other unrelated third parties. Id.
at 48 n. 10.
292. Id. at 47-48.
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293
it owned and managed over 200 shopping centers in forty-four states.
GGP Group operated as a unified entity with an integrated approach to
developing, operating, and managing a nationwide platform of retail
properties. 294 At the time of its bankruptcy filing on April 16, 2009, GGP
was the second-largest shopping mall operator and largest REIT in the
United States.295 The GGP Group reported consolidated revenue of $3.4
billion, $29.6 billion in assets, and $27.3 billion in liabilities as of
December 31, 2008.296
A total of 388 entities in the GGP Group filed for Chapter 11
protection in 2009.297 In this largest-ever real estate bankruptcy case,
more than 160 of GGP's bankruptcy-remote SPVs were involved in the
bankruptcy filing.29 8 SPVs held most of GGP's real estate properties and
directly guaranteed the loans.2 99 GGP created an SPV to protect each of
its real estate assets, the resulting cash flows, and the lenders' interests in
the assets and cash flows from their own and every other subsidiary's
credit risk.300
In the past, the GGP Group satisfied its capital needs through
mortgage loans obtained from banks and insurance companies, and then
increasingly through commercial mortgage backed securities ("CMBS")

293. Id. at 47 ("These include joint venture interests in approximately 50 properties, along with
non-controlling interests in several international joint ventures. The GGP Group also owns several
commercial office buildings and five master-planned communities, although these businesses
account for a smaller share of its operations." (footnote omitted)).
294. Id. at 48 & n. 1 ("Accounting, business development, construction, contracting, design,
finance, forecasting, human resources and employee benefits, insurance and risk management,
property services, marketing, leasing, legal, tax, treasury, cash management and other services are
provided or administered centrally for all properties under the GGP Group's ownership and
management.").
295. Brian M. Resnick & Steven C. Krause, Not So Bankruptcy-Remote SPEs and In re
General Growth Properties Inc., AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2009, available at
http://www.davispolk.com/iles/uploads/nsolvency/NotSoBankruptcy-RemoteSPEs-InReGeneral
GrowthPropertieslnc.pdf.
296. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 48. GGP Group's liabilities included its share
of indebtedness of its joint ventures. Id. at 48 n. 12. The court noted that:
[A]pproximately $24.85 billion of its liabilities accounted for the aggregate consolidated
outstanding indebtedness of the GGP Group. Of this, approximately $18.27 billion
constituted debt of the project-level Debtors secured by the respective properties, $1.83
billion of which was secured by the properties of the Subject Debtors. The remaining
$6.58 billion [is] of unsecured debt ....
Id. at 48 (footnote omitted). "The total debt of the ING Clarion and Helios Debtors was
$1,264,938,617.... The total debt of the Metlife Debtors was $568,090,030." Id. at 48 n.13.
297. Id. at 47 n.6.
298. Resnick & Krause, supra note 295.
299. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 49-50 ("Although each of the mortgage loans
was typically secured by a separate property owned by an individual debtor, many of the loans were
guaranteed by other GGP entities.").
300. See id. at 49.
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market transactions. 30 ' These loans were secured by "shopping center
properties and structured with three to seven-year maturities, low
amortization rates and balloon payments due at maturity., 30 2 GGP's
that the company would be able
business model was built on the premise
30 3
to refinance its debts before maturity.
The GGP Group's secured debt consisted primarily of conventional
mortgage debt 3 4 that was secured on over 100 properties separately
owned by SPVs, CMBS, 305 and mezzanine debt. 30 6 The GGP Group also
301. Id. at 50, 53.
302. Id.at 53.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 49. MetLife held the conventional mortgage debts of three mortgages. Id. Each
mortgage was "an obligation of a separate GGP subsidiary." Id. Some of the subject debtors that
issued MetLife mortgages were intended to function as SPVs. Id."Although each of the mortgage
loans was typically secured by a separate property owned by an individual debtor," GGP guaranteed
many of the loans. Id. at 50. The GGP Group members' typical mortgage loan had a three to sevenyear term, which included "low amortization and a large balloon payment at the end." Id.However,
some of the GGP Group members' mortgage loans had a significantly longer nominal maturity date.
Id. As a trade-off, these loans "had an anticipated repayment date ("ARD"), at which point the loan
became 'hyper-amortized,' even if the maturity date itself was as much as thirty years in the future."
Id. A failure to repay or refinance the loan at the ARD caused "a steep increase in interest rate[s], a
requirement that cash be kept at the project-level, with excess cash flow being applied to principal,
and a requirement that certain expenditures be submitted to the lender for its approval." ld. (footnote
omitted).
305. Id. at 48. GGP Group's mortgage loans were also financed in the CMBS markets. Id.at
50. "In a typical CMBS transaction, multiple mortgages are sold to a trust qualified as a real estate
mortgage conduit ("REMIC") for tax purposes. The REMIC in tum sells certificates entitling the
holders to payments from principal and interest on this large pool of mortgages." Id.at 5 1. The
CMBS securities holders have different rights to the income stream and bear different interest rates;
they may or may not have different control rights. See id.See also Ronald Greenspan & William
Nolan, Description of the Mortgage and Asset-Backed Securities Markets, Roles of Principal
Participants and Key Terms, in MORTGAGE AND ASSET BACKED SECURITIES LITIGATION
HANDBOOK § 1:6 (2008). The court in In re General Growth Properties described the REMIC
transfer process as follows:
The REMIC is managed by a master servicer that handles day-to-day loan administration
functions and services the loans when they are not in default. A special servicer takes
over management of the REMIC upon a transfer of authority. Such transfers take place
under certain limited circumstances, including: (i) a borrower's failure to make a
scheduled principal and interest payment, unless cured within 60 days, (ii) a borrower's
bankruptcy or insolvency, (iii) a borrower's failure to make a balloon payment upon
maturity, or (iv) a determination by the master servicer that a material and adverse
default under the loan is imminent and unlikely to be cured within 60 days. While a
master servicer is able to grant routine waivers and consents, it cannot agree to an
alteration of the material terms of a loan or mortgage. A special servicer has the ability to
agree to modify the loan once authority has been transferred, but often only with the
consent of the holders of the CMBS securities, or in some cases the holders of certain
levels of the debt.
In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 51 (footnote omitted).
306. In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 BR. at 51. In this case, the debtors were obligors on the
mezzanine loans from at least four lenders, including MetLife. Id.In mezzanine loan transactions,
including the MetLife mezzanine loan:
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had unsecured debt, which mostly consisted of trade debt and other
financial obligations owned by one of its holding companies. 0 7 GGP's
other debt included five interest-rate swap agreements,30 8 outstanding
letters of credit, surety bonds,30 9 and promissory notes.3 1 °
During the latter half of 2008, the crisis in the credit markets spread
to CMBS markets, which affected the GGP Group's ability to refinance
its maturing debt on commercially acceptable terms.3 11 The constriction
in the credit markets and CMBS markets created insurmountable
liquidity problems for GGP.3 12 The liquidity crisis was significant for
GGP Group, because its pre-bankruptcy CMBS debt was nearly $15
billion out of its $27.3 billion, making it the largest CMBS borrower.3t 3
This was a critical development as GGP relied on access to capital
markets, which became extremely difficult in 2008 due to the economic
recession in the United States.314
The GGP Group executives made numerous unsuccessful attempts
refimance
by contacting dozens of banks, insurance companies,
to
pension funds, regional brokers, and investment banking firms like

[T]he lender is the holder of a mortgage on the property held by one of the Subject
Debtors. The lender makes a further loan, ordinarily at a higher interest rate, to a [SPE]
formed to hold the equity interest in the mortgage-level borrower. The loan to the [SPE]
is secured only by the stock or other equity interest of the mortgage level borrower. The
[SPE] typically has no other debt and its business is limited to its equity interest in the
property-owning subsidiary.
Id.
307. Id. Members of GGP Group were obligated to pay approximately $6.58 billion of
unsecured debt on the bankruptcy petition date. Id.
308. Id. at 52 ("The GGP Group had entered into five interest-rate swap agreements as of
December 31, 2008. The total national amount of the agreements was $1.08 billion, with an average
fixed pay rate of 3.38% and an average variable receive rate of LIBOR. The Company made April
2009 payments to only one of the counterparties, and two of the swaps have been terminated.").
309. Id ("[A]s of December 31, 2008, the Company also had outstanding letters of credit and
surety bonds in the amount of $286.2 million.").
310. Id. at 52-53 ("GGP LP is the promissor on a note in the principal amount of $245 million,
payable to the Comptroller of the State of New York, as trustee for the New York State Common
Retirement Fund .... Additionally GGP LP is the promissor on a note in the amount of
$93,712,500.... payable to Ivanhoe Capital, LP, and secured by a pledge of GGP LP's shares in the
GGP Ivanhoe, Inc. joint venture.").
311. Id.
at 53.
312. Id at 53-54. ("As additional mortgage loans began to mature, [GGP's] liquidity problems
grew worse. For example, two large loans from Deutsche Bank matured on November 28, 2008. In
return for brief extensions of the maturity date, Deutsche Bank required the Debtors to increase the
rate of interest 3.75%, from LIBOR plus 225 basis points to LIBOR plus 600 basis points, 75 basis
points over the prior default interest rate. Additionally, Deutsche Bank required excess cash flow
from the properties to be escrowed in a lockbox account and applied entirely to the relevant
properties, with surplus used to amortize the principal on the relevant loan.").
313. Resnick & Krause, supranote 295.
314. See id.
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Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. 315 The GGP Group attempted to
find refinancing for its unsecured debt, but its efforts to raise debt or
equity capital were unsuccessful.' 16 GGP hired an investment bank that
specialized in debt restructuring to renegotiate the debt, but lenders were
unwilling to consent to additional forbearances, which caused defaults
and cross-defaults.3 17 GGP's attempts to sell assets to generate cash to
pay down its debts also failed because potential purchasers were unable
to acquire financing.31 8
Despite the financial crisis, the GGP Group's shopping centers had
steady cash flows.31 9 However, the GGP Group faced approximately
$18.4 billion in outstanding debt that had matured or would mature by
2012 .320 Based on the state of the financial and credit markets and facing
defaults on several loans, the GGP Group believed that its capital
structure had become unmanageable and began to contemplate Chapter
11 filing.32 However, at the time of the Chapter 11 petition filing, most
of debtor's CMBS loans, including most owed by the SPVs, were not in
default, were not experiencing financial distress, were adequately
collateralized, and some had excess cash flows. 322 Some loans were due
or hyper-amortizing as of the petition date, and others had due dates of
2011, 2012, and later.323

315. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 53. GGP Group finally obtained refinancing
through Teachers Insurance. Id. at 50. "The borrowers under the Teachers Loans [were] all nonDebtor entities, and the maturity dates range[d] from five to seven years, with an option for the
lender to extend maturity for an additional three years. The Teachers Loans were not in default as of
the Petition Date." Id. at 50 n.17.
316. Id. at 53.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 55 & n.23. ("The Company's [Net Operating Income ("NOI")] for its operations
involving the operating, development and management of its shopping centers, office buildings and
commercial properties totaled $2.59 billion in 2008, which was a 4.5% increase over the year
before.").
320. Id. at 55.
321. Id. at 54.
322. Id. at 57-58; Resnick & Krause, supranote 295.
323. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 55, 57-58 ("[llndividual debtors that are the
subject of these Motions were in varying degrees of financial distress in April 2009. Loans to four
of the Subject Debtors had cross-defaulted to the defaults of affiliates or would have been in default
as a result of other bankruptcy petitions. Of the loans to the remaining sixteen Subject Debtors, one
had gone into hyper-amortization in 2008. Interest had increased by 4.26%. Five of the Subject
Debtors had mortgage debt maturing or hyper-amortizing in 2010, two in 2011, and one in 2012.
The remaining seven Subject Debtors were either guarantors on maturing loans of other entities or
their property was collateral for a loan that was maturing, or there existed other considerations that
in the Debtors' view placed the loan in distress, such as a high loan-to-value ratio." (footnote
omitted)).
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On Chapter 11 petition date, GGP requested to use cash collateral
324
and sought approval of debtor-in-possession ("DIP") financing.
Project-level lenders objected based on various concerns: (1) that
security of their loans would be adversely affected, (2) that such a
financing facility arrangement would be a violation of separateness of
individual SPVs from originator or parent-level entity, 325 and (3) that the
approval of DIP facility would constitute a de facto substantive
consolidation of estates.326 Despite these objections, GGP was able to
secure a $400 million DIP facility from various lenders,327 without
providing guarantees by SPVs or a pledge of their assets.328 Adequate
protection was provided for the project-level lenders including "the
payment of interest at the non-default rate, continued maintenance of the
properties, a replacement lien on the cash being upstreamed from the
project-level Debtors and a second priority lien on certain other
properties. 32 9
In addition, the bankruptcy court considered several motions to
dismiss certain Chapter 11 cases filed by one or more debtors ("Subject
Debtors") that were owned directly or indirectly by GGP. 330 The motions
to dismiss claimed that the premature filings for bankruptcy by Subject
Debtors' were in bad faith and that one of GGP's entities was ineligible
to petition. 33' The debtors that filed for bankruptcy and the official
committee of unsecured creditors objected to the Subject Debtors'
motions. 332
The court in In re General Growth Propertiesheld that grounds for
dismissal of a bankruptcy petition exist "if it is clear on the filing date
that 'there was no reasonable likelihood that the debtor intended to
324. Id. at 55.
325. Id.
326. Resnick & Krause, supranote 295.
327. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 412 B.R. 122, 123 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
328. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 55 ("DIP financing was arranged, but the DIP
lender did not obtain liens on the properties of the project-level Debtors that could arguably
adversely affect the lien interests of the existing mortgage lenders ... .
329. Id.
330. Id. at 46-47 ("One of the Motions was filed by ING Clarion Capital Loan Services LLC
('ING Clarion'), as special servicer to certain secured lenders; one of the Motions was filed by
Helios AMC, LLC ('Helios'), as special servicer to other secured lenders; and three of the Motions
were filed by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and KBC Bank N.V. (together, 'Metlife', and
together with ING Clarion and Helios, the 'Movants'). Each of the Movants [was] a secured lender
with a loan to one of the Subject Debtors." (footnotes omitted)).
331. Id. at 47. Movants also contended that "Debtors had a good faith obligation to delay
Chapter II filing until they were temporally closer to an actual default." Id. at 59. "Movants [did]
not contend that the parent companies acted in bad faith in filing their own Chapter 11 petitions." Id.
at 62.
332. Id. at 46-47.
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reorganize and no reasonable probability that it would eventually emerge
from bankruptcy proceedings.' 333 The court noted that the petition must
be dismissed if two conditions exist: "'objective futility of the
reorganization process and subjective bad faith in filing the
petition ......
The totality of the circumstances
determines whether
335
good faith for filing a bankruptcy petition exists.
The court also held that under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor is
not required to be insolvent before filing for bankruptcy, 336 and that
there is no prerequisite in the law that requires a specific level of
financial distress before a bankruptcy petition may be filed. 337 Thus,
many courts have denied motions to dismiss, despite the fact that the
subject debtors were able to meet current expenses. 338
ING Clarion Capital Loan Services LLC, Helios AMC, LLC,
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and KBC Bank N.V.
(collectively, the "Movants") presented several arguments before the
bankruptcy court. First, they argued that the bankruptcy-remote structure
of the project-level SPV debtors required that financial distress of each
SPV be analyzed exclusively from the SPV's perspective. 339 The
Movants argued that the court "should consider only the financial
circumstances of the individual [SPV], and that consideration of the
financial problems of the [GGP] Group in judging the good faith of an
individual filing would violate the purpose of the [SPV] structure."34' 0
The bankruptcy court rejected the Movants' argument and
concluded that in deciding to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy each SPV
was justified in considering its independent need for restructuring as

333. Id.at 56 (quoting C-TC 9th Ave. P'ship v. Norton Co. (In re C-TC 9th Ave. P'ship), 113
F.3d 1304, 1309 (2d Cir. 1997)).
334. Id.(quoting In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, 725 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
See also In re RCM Global Long Term Capital Appreciation Fund, Ltd., 200 B.R. 514, 520 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996). "Case law recognizes that a bankruptcy petition should be dismissed for lack of
good faith only sparingly and with great caution." In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 56
(citing Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 700 (4th Cir. 1989); In re G.S. Distrib., Inc., 331 B.R.
552, 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
335. Id.(quoting In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. at 725).
336. Id.at 61 (citing In re The Bible Speaks, 65 B.R. 415,424 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986)).
337. Id.(quoting United States v. Huebner, 48 F.3d 376, 379 (9th Cir. 1994)).
338. Id.(citing In re Century/ML Cable Venture, 294 B.R. 9, 35-36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003);
In re Cent. Jersey Airport Servs., 282 B.R. 176, 181 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2002); In re Chris-Marine
U.S.A., Inc., 262 B.R. 118, 125 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001)). In In re Century/ML Cable Venture, the
debtor was able to meet its current expenses but had a substantial financial liability that could not be
met from its current cash flow or without substantial asset liquidation. 294 B.R. at 35-36. The
bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss based on those facts. Id.at 35.
339. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 61.
340. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2011

45

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 12

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 40:177

well as the financial distress of GGP as a whole. 34 1 The bankruptcy court
reasoned that the Movants should have been aware that given the large
and integrated corporate structure of GGP, the financial situation of the
originator-parent
company would impact its subsidiaries, which included
42
3

SPVs.

The bankruptcy court also considered the actions of the SPVs'
independent managers. The operating agreements stated that the
independent managers should consider the interests of GGP, including
its respective creditors.343 These interests were to be expressed through
the unanimous written consent of independent managers when voting,
and compliance with General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware
that extends directors and managers' duties to the corporation and its
shareholders. 3 " When considered in light of GGP's financial condition,
the SPVs' filings were not premature.345 As a result, the bankruptcy
court denied Subject Debtors' motions and held that Chapter 11
bankruptcy filings by SPVs were not premature.346

341. Seeid.at60.
342. Id. at 61 ("Movants do not contend that they were unaware that they were extending credit
to a company that was part of a much larger group, and that there were benefits as well as possible
detriments from this structure. If the ability of the Group to obtain refinancing became impaired, the
financial situation of the subsidiary would inevitably be impaired.").
343. Id. at 63; In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, 735 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[I]t
is universally agreed that when a corporation approaches insolvency or actually becomes insolvent,
directors' fiduciary duties expand to include general creditors. Nearly all states' law is in
accord...."). See also Clarkson Co. Ltd. V. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting a
fiduciary duty to creditors in New York); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787-88
(Del. Ch. 1992) (noting a fiduciary duty to creditors in Delaware); Tampa Waterworks Co. v.
Wood, 121 So. 789, 791 (Fla. 1929) (noting a fiduciary duty to creditors in Florida); Francis v.
United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824 (N.J. 1981) (noting a fiduciary duty to creditors in New
Jersey).
344. In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 63. The court found that Delaware law
requires directors of a solvent corporation to consider the interests of the shareholders in exercising
their fiduciary duties. Id. at 64. The court discussed one case in particular to support this conclusion:
In North American Catholic EducationalProgrammingFoundation,Inc. v. Gheewalla,
930 A.2d 92[, 101] (Del. 2007), the Delaware Supreme Court held for the first time that
the directors of an insolvent corporation have duties to creditors that may be enforceable
in a derivative action on behalf of the corporation. But it rejected the proposition ... that
directors of a Delaware corporation have duties to creditors when operating in the "zone
of insolvency," stating "[w]hen a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of
insolvency, the focus for Delaware directors does not change: directors must continue to
discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their
business judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its
shareholderowners."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewala,
930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007)).
345. Id.at 65.
346. See id.
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The bankruptcy court also analyzed the second element of whether
the Chapter 11 petition was filed in subjective good faith.3 47 The
Movants argued that the SPV acted in subjective bad faith because "(i)
they failed to negotiate prior to filing, and (ii) the initial 'Independent
Managers' of several of the [SPV]'s were fired and replaced shortly
before the Petition Date., 348 In response, the bankruptcy court first stated
that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code requires that a borrower negotiate
with its lender before filing for Chapter 11 petition and that no evidence
was presented to conclude that discussions prior to the filing would have
provided an adequate solution to the problem.349 Second, the bankruptcy
court dismissed the arguments that independent directors were fired in
bad faith, because relevant organizational documents of the SPVs did
not prohibit the dismissals, and the replacements had appropriate
experience to determine whether the bankruptcy filing was necessary.35 °
This case is significant because it allowed GGP's SPVs to file for
bankruptcy prior to being insolvent. 35' The holding of the bankruptcy
court challenges the effectiveness of the SPV structure as a means of
ensuring that a subsidiary will be isolated from its originator's
bankruptcy filing.352 Through this ruling, the court challenges the
bankruptcy-remote requirements, such as whether independent directors'
unanimous vote is necessary in order to petition for bankruptcy.353 The
decision that SPVs' directors must consider shareholders' interests when
deciding whether to file for bankruptcy may make it more difficult "to
create an [SPV] structure that fully isolates assets from the financial
difficulties of corporate parents. 354
E. Fraudulent Conveyance Attack on SPVs
In addition to litigation risks, securitization is susceptible to being
classified as a fraudulent conveyance under federal bankruptcy or state
law. A fraudulent transfer law is a tool that can be used to avoid asset
securitization transactions.3 55
347. Id. ("The test [prescribed] in C-TC 9th Ave. P'ship is a two-fold test, requiring proof of
subjective bad faith as well as objective futility." (citing C-TC 9th Ave. P'ship v. Norton Co. (In re
C-TC 9th Ave. P'ship), 113 F.3d 1304, 1309-10 (2d Cir. 1997))).
348. Id. at 66.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 68.
351. See id. at 69. See also Jesse Cook-Dubin, New York Bankruptcy Court Topples
ContractualBarriersto FilingChapter //: PartI, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2009, at 28, 28.
352. Cook-Dubin, supra note 351 at 28.
353. See id.
354. Resnick & Krause, supranote 295.
355. See Klee & Butler, supra note 43, at 66. Klee & Butler note that:

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2011

47

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 12

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:177

Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code defines a conveyance as
fraudulent if (1) it is voluntarily or involuntarily made "with actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors,3 56 or if the assets were
transferred for less than their reasonably equivalent value,357 and (2) "as
a result of [a] transfer, the Originator is left undercapitalized, or has
insufficient assets to pay its debts as they come due, or is insolvent at the
time the transfer is made, or becomes insolvent as a result of the
transfer., 358 Thus, if the originator files for bankruptcy, a sale of assets
from the originator to SPV is a "transfer ...of an interest of the debtor
in property," and is subject to fraudulent transfer scrutiny. 59 Section
544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code also extends the authority to the trustee
transfer that would be invalid under the
to avoid any pre-petition
360
applicable state law.

It is the view of some scholars that fraudulent transfer law is not very applicable to
asset securitization transactions because market forces will prevent such a transaction
from occurring. Market forces, however, will not always prevent a fraudulent transfer
from occurring simply because the asset securitization is in the form of a financing
transaction. The Originator will always receive cash for the transactions. In addition,
credit rating agencies, credit enhancement devices and other market participants might
help to ensure that the transaction is for reasonably equivalent value. However, credit
ratings focus exclusively on the SPV and its assets, and whether they are sufficient to
protect the interests of the SPV's investors. Credit rating agencies do not focus on
protecting the interests of the Originator or its creditors. Similarly, credit enhancement
devices are designed to provide protection for the investors of the SPV, not the
Originator or its creditors.
Id.(footnote omitted). See also Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The
Dynamics ofFinancialProductDevelopment, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 1553, 1588 (2008) ("[Ilt is easy
to see that the constructive fraud rules pose little threat to the prototypical securitization transaction.
The transfer of the securitized assets from the Originator to the SPE reduces the value of the
Originator's assets, but that reduction is balanced by a commensurate increase in the value of the
Originator's equity interest in the SPE. If the SPE is solvent-which should be a safe assumption if
it conducts no other operations and the assets transferred to it are sufficient to gamer a high credit
rating for the securitized debt that it issues-the net effect of the transfer on the value of the
Originator should be nil, or close to it. So constructive fraud has, quite reasonably, gotten short
shrift as a threat to the prototypical securitization transaction.").
356. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(l)(A) (2006).
357. Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i).
358. Klee & Butler, supra note 43, at 65-66 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 548).
359. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). See also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent
Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 854 (1985) ("Fraudulent
conveyance law should never apply to arms-length transactions, even if it appears after the fact that
the debtor's actions injured the creditors."); Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and
CorporateRisk Allocation, 72 TUL. L. REV. 101, 115 (1997) ("The focus in fraudulent transfer
analysis is whether the transaction creates value from the perspective of all of the firm's investorsthat is, whether the reason for the transfer is efficiency-based or only distributional.").
360. See II U.S.C. § 544(b).
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IV.

THE IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL DECISIONS ON SPVS

The use of an SPV as a bankruptcy-remote entity has provided
uneven results because of numerous judicially created exceptions to the
treatment of an SPV as a separate legal entity. For instance, In re LTV
Steel Co. held that the originator could use assets that were sold and
belonged to a bankruptcy-remote SPV for its reorganization. 36' In In re
Pacific Lumber Co., the court left the possibility that in the future it may
substantively consolidate an SPV and the originating entity, and used the
value of investor's collateral to satisfy the originator's outstanding
debts.362 Further, the court in In re General Growth Properties Inc.
stated that SPVs must consider the interests of their originators.3 63 Due
to GGP's integrated corporate structure where the originator's
bankruptcy would affect its subsidiaries, the court allowed solvent SPVs
to file for bankruptcy along with their insolvent originator.3 6
Court findings reveal a variety of circumstances when the general
principal of an SPV's bankruptcy-remoteness has been ignored to satisfy
a judicially created goal, such as saving an originator's workers from
unemployment and preventing an originator's bankruptcy from having
an adverse impact on the community.365 Recent case law developments
suggest that the practice of securitization and the formation of SPVs
should address questions of how, when, and under what circumstances
the SPV may be pierced, substantively consolidated, or ignored as a
separate legal entity.
The tests for determining whether the originator and the SPV are
substantively consolidated, replete with their abundant elements,
lc
366
introduce uncertainty to any securitization transaction. Due to the lack
of specific statutory guidance,36 7 there is uncertainty about when a
bankruptcy court will employ a substantive consolidation test and, if it
does, which elements it will consider relevant to its analysis. 368 Courts
361. See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 287 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
362. See Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber
Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 249-50, 249 n.25 (5th Cir. 2009).
363. See In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 61-65 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
364. Id. at 64-65. In addition, the court challenged the certainty of the operating agreement
provisions of an SPV, such as the requirement of a unanimous vote of independent directors to file
at 63.
bankruptcy. Id.
365. See, e.g., In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 249-50; In re Gen. Growth Props., 409 B.R.
at 55-56, 60; In re LTVSteel Co., 274 B.R. at 286.
366. See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 138 B.R. 723, 763-65 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992) (noting the importance of an evaluation of consolidation factors).
367 See E. Kristen Moye, Non-Consolidationand True Sale/Transfer OpinionsIn Securitized
Real Estate Loan Transactions,PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., May 2005, at 7, 9-10.
368. See Richard D. Jones & Richard A. Bendit, PracticalAdvice on the Preparationof the
Substantive Non-Consolidation Opinion in Real Estate Transactions, DECHERT LLP, at 3-5, 15
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list thirty-two optional considerations of the element, balancing, and
alter ego tests that it may include in the substantive consolidation
analysis."' This list of possible elements and unlimited discretionary
judgment that a bankruptcy court may apply during any substantive
consolidation analysis makes the consequences of securitization
unpredictable.
V.

SPV SOLUTIONS AND BEST PRACTICES

The odds of creating a bankruptcy-remote SPV that can perform the
function of securitizing selected assets of a corporation can be increased.
A useful approach is to study the successes of other corporations and the
judicial decisions of federal and state cases that have been brought by
plaintiffs who sought to have a corporation and its SPV consolidated.
Three topics deserve scrutiny: the structure of the transaction, external
credit enhancements, and the special need for investor due diligence.
A.

Structure of the Transaction

An originator, an SPV, and their respective attorneys must structure
the transaction to reduce the threat of substantive consolidation.
Transaction planning must reflect the current existing case law regarding
the substantive consolidation and recurring themes that permit courts to
employ their equitable powers to order consolidation between two
separate legal entities.3 70 Each transaction should be examined for:
"
•
*
*
*

*
*
*
*
*

Compliance with SPV formalities.
Separateness of SPV decision-making.
Separateness of SPV operations.
SPV's possession of its assets.
SPV's management of its liabilities.
Separateness of SPV's offices.
Separateness of SPV's financial statements.
Arms-length nature of SPV's transactions with originator (and
affiliates).
Disclosure of the separateness of the SPV and its assets.
Separateness of the relationship between the SPV and third371
parties (contracting parties, creditors, certificate holders).

(2003), available at http://www.dechert.com/library/PracticalAdvice-on the Preprartion_RJones_
6-0.pdf ("[It] is equally uncertain which judicial test or tests will be applied by any given court.").
369. See supra Part III.B.
370. StructuredFinancingTechniques, supranote 31, at 559-60.
371. Id.
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Unique facts and circumstances must be considered in the overall
context of the transaction and addressed separately.
Documents expressly stating and limiting duties, obligations, and
powers of each separate entity will prevent commingling of assets,
confusion of responsibilities, and other costly misunderstandings.3 72
Separateness and limitation covenants will further address issues
regarding what type of assets an entity may have, what kind of
indebtedness it may incur,3 73 and the type of transactions SPVs may
conduct with other entities.374
SPVs should have specific rules relating to their governance. An
SPV's board of directors 375 and stockholders should hold regular
meetings to conduct corporate business, where a quorum is present in
person for at least one meeting per year. 376 Securitization agreements
should require at least twenty-five percent of the SPV's directors to be
independent.3 77 SPV's business and operations decisions should be made
independently and without influence from the originator or its other
entities.378 Dealings between an SPV and any of its affiliates should be
on arms-length terms, and should receive approval from the majority of
372. Special Report, supra note 221, at 415 (noting the steps to establish and maintain
separateness of an SPV). See also In re FiberMark, Inc., No. 04-10463 cab, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS
2472, at *8-9 (Bankr. D. Vt. Dec. 2, 2005) (noting reasons for the court's consolidation of entities).
373. Resnick & Krause, supranote 295.
374. JAN JOB DE VRIES ROBBE, SECURITIZATION LAW AND PRACTICE INTHE FACE OF THE
CREDIT CRUNCH 17 (2008) ("The constituent documents of the SPV will also place strict limits on
what business dealings the SPV can engage in, so as to minimize the incurrence of liabilities by the
SPV ....).
375. See StructuredFinancingTechniques, supra note 31, at 593 app. C ("At least one senior
officer of the SPV (who may also be a member of the Board of Directors of the SPV) will be, or
have the same qualifications as, an independent director.").
376. See id The Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of The Association
of the Bar of the City of New York suggests regular meetings of directors should be held at least
quarterly. Id. The SPV should keep and safeguard complete minutes of the SPV's Board of
Directors and stockholder meetings. Id.
377. Id. The Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of The Association of
the Bar of the City of New York suggests that at least one fourth of SPV directors be independent.
Id.See also STANDARD & POOR'S, STRUCTURED FINANCE: LEGAL CRITERIA FOR U.S. STRUCTURED
FINANCE TRANSACTIONS 51 (2004), http://www.mbaa.org/files/ResourceCenter/RegAB/RegABLegalCriteriaforStructuredFinance(S&P).pdf ("'[l]ndependent director' means a duly appointed
member of the board of directors of the relevant entity who should not have been, at the time of
such appointment or at any time in the preceding five years, (a) a direct or indirect legal or
beneficial owner in such entity or any of its affiliates (excluding de minimus ownership interests),
(b) a creditor, supplier, employee, officer, director, family member, manager, or contractor of such
entity or its affiliates, or (c) a person who controls (whether directly, indirectly, or otherwise) such
entity or its affiliates or any creditor, supplier, employee, officer, director, manager, or contractor of
such entity or its affiliates.").
378. See Mark S. Indelicato, Securitization Provides Means to Protect Assets, N.Y. L.J., Feb.
19, 2002, at 9 (suggesting that SPVs should preferably have two independent members of its
originator).
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the board of directors, including each independent director.3 79 The SPV
should "act solely in its own corporate name and through its own
authorized officers and agents., 380 The board of directors, including
every independent director, should approve any declaration of SPV's
dividends, while the SPV should manage the payment of its own payroll,
operating expenses, and other liabilities.38
The SPV should be physically and financially separate from its
originator, as indicated by separate offices, separate records, and
separate financial statements that conform to GAAP and are audited
annually. 38 2 The SPV's debt security holders should receive the audited
annual financial statements as well as un-audited quarterly financial
reports.383 Neither the originator nor its other subsidiaries should
guarantee an SPV's debts and vice versa. 384 The SPV should not acquire
any obligations, securities, or make loans to its originator or originator's
affiliates. 385 The SPV must keep its money and assets separate from its
originator's money and assets, including keeping separate bank
accounts.386 If the originator or any of its affiliates include the SPV in its
SPV and the
consolidated financial statements, "the existence of the 387
ownership of its assets [should] be disclosed in a footnote.,
The nature of assets retained by the originator and the types that are
being sold to the SPV also must be considered. The originator should
retain assets needed for operations and some that provide a liquiditycushion if cash needs to be raised to finance the originator's operations.

379. See StructuredFinancingTechniques, supranote 31, at 593 app. C. Transactions must be
"on terms that are not more or less favorable to the SPV than terms and conditions available at the
time to the SPV for comparable transactions with unaffiliated persons... "Id.
380.

Id.

381. Id. "Investment guidelines and criteria will be established by a majority of the Board of
Directors including at least one.., independent director. Investments will be made by the SPV
directly or by brokers engaged and paid by the SPV. Investments will be carried by the SPV in its
own name... " Id. at 594. "In the event employees of the SPV participate in pension, insurance
and other benefit plans of the parent or any affiliates thereof, the SPV will on a current basis
reimburse the parent or such affiliate, as the case may be, for the SPV's pro rata share of the costs
thereof." Id. at 593-94.
382. See In re Richton Int'l Corp., 12 B.R. 555, 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting the
importance of observing corporate formalities and avoidance of commingling of assets and business
functions).
383. StructuredFinancingTechniques, supranote 31, at 594 app. C.
384. Id.
385.
386.

Id.
Id.

387. Id.
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B. External Credit Enhancement
Efficient credit-enhancement strategies minimize the total cost of
raising funds while maximizing the proceeds that an issuer realizes from
a transaction.388 SPV structures that are most attractive for investment
include credit enhancements that protect against damage from high-risk
events such as substantive consolidation of originator and SPV,
premature SPV bankruptcy filing, or allowance to use SPV funds in DIP
financing.
Each SPV can implement two forms of credit enhancement:
internal and external. The internal credit enhancements can include
and
senior/subordinate
reserve
funds,
over-collateralization,
structures. 38 9 They improve the rating awarded by the rating agencies
and help protect the investor from loss based on their priority in the
repayment schedule of the SPV. 390 Thus, for example, if there is a
shortfall of cash in any given period, senior bondholders receive their
principal and interest prior to the bondholders with junior interest. 391
Since this structure does not fully protect junior bondholders against the
risk of loss, they should seek external protection methods. Common
forms of external protection include credit enhancements such as letters
of credits ("LOCs"), surety bonds, and guarantees.392 They provide
protection to bond classes against default from third-party guarantees,
such as insurance,393 which relies on the credit quality of a third party.394
388. Chris Ames, Credit Enhancement Alternatives, CORP. FIN., Oct. 1994, at 12, 12.
389. FABozzI, supranote 26, at 379.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 359. The cash that remains after all scheduled period payments are made is called
excess spread. Id. This excess spread is the first line of defense against collateral losses. Id. When
the excess spread has been depleted, absent third-party external insurance, the next lowest rated
class will be to be negatively affected by the loss. Id. See also Anand K. Bhattacharya, et al., The
Interaction of MBS Markets and Primary Mortgage Rates, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Fall 2008, at 16,
19-20 ("Private credit enhancement is most commonly created in the form of subordination, which
means that a portion of the deal is subordinate or 'junior' in priority of cash flows, and is the first to
absorb non-recoverable losses in order to protect the remaining (or 'senior') bonds. A common
technique is to divide the subordinated part of the deal into different bonds, each with different
ratings (which typically range from double-A to unrated first-loss pieces) and degrees of exposure
to credit losses. For example, the non-rated 'first loss' bond class is the first to absorb losses; if this
bond class is exhausted, the losses are then allocated to the bond class that is second-lowest in initial
priority and so forth. Subordinate tranches trade at significantly higher yields than the senior bonds
to compensate investors for the incremental riskiness and greater likelihood of credit related
losses.").
392. StructuredFinancingTechniques, supra note 31, at 549.
393. FABOzzI, supra note 26, at 379. See also MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Spiegel Holdings, Inc.,
[2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,902 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2004) (discussing
insurer's standing and right to sue insolvent originator on behalf of noteholders for violations of
federal securities law).
394. Ames, supra note 388, at 12.
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These insurance policies are generally written to cover losses up to a
specified amount from an asset pool. 395 The investment can also be
insured against substantive consolidation and SPV insolvency. Since the
insurer takes the first-loss position if the SPV becomes insolvent, and
because the processing of claims can be an arduous task, the insurance
entails high costs. 396 However, especially during periods of high
volatility in financial markets and associated high levels of corporate
bankruptcies, insurance provides an important means of protecting
investment in an SPV.
Bond insurance is a financial guarantee from an AAA-rated
monoline insurance company such as Capital Markets Assurance
Corporation, Financial Guaranty Insurance Company, Assured Guaranty
Municipal Corp. (formerly FSA), and MBIA Inc., which guarantees that
the insurer will receive timely payments of all principal and interest on
its investment. 397 The payments will come from the cash flow of the
underlying asset pool or from the insurer.3 98 These bond insurers
guarantee one hundred percent of the principal and interest payments of
a transaction. 399 Bond insurers provide additional diligence through their
scrutiny of the issuer's operations and assets, their specialization and
familiarity with many asset types, and their adaptability to each
customer's reporting requirements.4 °0
An LOC is another common form of external credit enhancement.
LOCs guarantee that a specified amount of funds will be available to the
issuer in case of cash shortfalls from the collateral.40 ' SPVs may utilize
triggered LOCs if certain events occur. Triggered LOCs are designed to
be borrowed against in full, with the borrowed funds deposited into a
trust account.402
C. Investor Due Diligence
Given the risks of investing in an SPV, originators and their SPVs
need to anticipate the concerns of potential investors. First, potential
395. Id. at 13.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. FABozzi, supra note 26, at 359. Bond insurance is also referred to as surety bond or a
wrap. Id. The principal payments are generally made without acceleration, unless insurer agrees or
elects to do so. Id. The risk of a rating downgrade for a bond provider is small. See id.
399. Ames, supra note 388, at 13.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 12.
402. Id. The most common trigger is the downgrade of the LOC provider. Id. This mandatory
drawdown of the LOC converts the LOC to cash, insulating the ABS from the provider's
downgrade. Id.
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investors may be concerned with the nature of the assets controlled by
the SPV, and with the SPV's financial, liquidity, and solvency
conditions, and those of the originator. The originator should prepare for
the fact that when buying an ABS, professional investors will look
beyond the rating assigned to it by the rating agency and engage in their
own thorough due diligence for each investment.4 °3
ABS investors will be principally concerned with the quality of the
assets that back the debt rather than the quality of the originator's overall
assets .4 ° The In re LTV Steel Co. opinion demonstrates that investors
should be aware of the type of assets the originator sells to the SPV and
of the value and liquidity of assets the originator retains for its
operations. 40 5 Therefore, the investor is likely to consider whether the
originator liquidated assets to the SPV and only retained illiquid assets
that may be hard and unprofitable to liquidate on a short notice. The
investor is also likely to consider whether circumstances exist that might
prompt the bankruptcy court to use its equitable powers and allow the
originator to use SPV's assets to prevent massive layoffs, cancellation of
retirement benefits, or negative economic impact on the originator's
local region.
In re General Growth Properties teaches that investors will be
encouraged to pay careful attention to the financial conditions of a
parent-originator that may have a direct effect on a solvent bankruptcyremote SPV.40 6 As the holding of the case indicates, a solvent SPV may
file for bankruptcy prior to reaching insolvency if the SPV is deemed by
the court to be integrated into the corporate structure of the originator
who becomes insolvent.40 7 The decision also suggests that investors
should be cautious about the reliability and enforceability of bankruptcyremote provisions, such as the requirement of the unanimous vote of
40 8
independent directors to file for bankruptcy.
Given the opinion of In re Lancelot Investors Fund, L.P.,4 °9
investors or their agents will be more inclined to investigate the
originator, the SPV, and the lending institutions to assure the
403. See Louise Bowman, Securitization: The S Word, EUROMONEY, Nov. 2007, at 78, 79. See
also BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 128, at 4 ("It was also observed that some investors
did not seem to have conducted adequate independent due diligence to understand the risk profiles
of SPE transactions that they had invested in.").
404. Ayotte & Gaon, supra note 25, at 2-3.
405. See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 286-87 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001).
406. See In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 57-58, 60-61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
407. See id. at 64-65.
408. See id. at 63-64.
409. Peterson v. Ellerbrock Family Trust, LLC (In re Lancelot Investors Fund, L.P.), 408 B.R.
167 (Bankr. N.D. I11.2009).
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authenticity of their business operations. 410 Further, the investors can be
expected to research the type of assets that are being sold to the SPV, the
quality of assets sold, and the assets' past and current performance.
Sophisticated investors recognize that the risk of sponsoring a deal
varies with the size, financial history, leadership, and visibility of the
company, and will factor these issues into their investment decisions.1
Finally, investors will attempt to protect themselves against the
potentially devastating consequences of substantive consolidation, as
occurred in In re Pacific Lumber Co. 4 12 They are likely to seek the
reassurance of external credit enhancements as means to reduce losses if
the assets and liabilities of insolvent originators and solvent SPVs are
consolidated in the bankruptcy proceeding.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Despite the separate legal structure of an SPV, recent legal
decisions have reinforced the position that an SPV is bankruptcy-remote,
not bankruptcy-proof, when its parent-originator becomes insolvent.
Thus, an SPV's assets are likely to survive challenges to its
independence, but they are not certain to be excluded from recovery
attempts.
As determined by the courts, an SPV's structure may be pierced,
substantively consolidated, or legally modified to satisfy creditor and
investor claims when its originating entity becomes insolvent.
Consequently, the court decisions in In re LTV Steel Co., In re Pacific
Lumber Co., and In re General Growth Properties Inc. have direct
impacts on creditors and investors' ability to recover their investments.
The judgments are also instructive because they provide a set of issues
that the originator and the SPV should consider when designing and
managing an SPV that can be judged as deserving of its continued
independence in the event of the originator's bankruptcy or a claim by
investors to recoup their investments.
Specifically, originators who engage in securitization through the
creation of an SPV must consider the use of ever-more elaborate
methods of protection. This will include external credit enhancements
and careful structuring and managing of the underlying transaction to
maximize the expectation that an SPV will deliver the benefit of being
410. Id. at 172.
411. See Anne Schwimmer, PrivateInvestors Carve Out 'EmergingAsset' ABS Niche: Some
Investors Get Junk-Like Yields on Secured Deals, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Mar. 20, 1995, at
11, 11.

412. See Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber
Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2009).
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bankruptcy-remote. Such precautions and augmentations are necessary
because, despite their continuing popularity as an investment structure,
SPVs present risks for creditors and investors that affect the practice of
securitization and the overall investment results.
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